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Foreword 
       
 This paper is the culmination of two years of studying Canadian environmental policy; 
however, it is in no way the end. Canadian environmental policy encompasses so many facets, a 
wide variety of historical and emerging issues, as well as areas of clash and confrontation with 
other policy domains. As a result, it is unjustified to believe that one can become an expert in 
Canadian environmental policy in the span of two years. Nevertheless, through exploring current 
topics of environmental policy, such as the political economy of oil transportation, understanding 
of the factors influencing policy, analyzing policies in terms of sustainability, and understanding 
the challenges of jurisdictional responsibility help illuminate the broader aspects of 
environmental policy within Canada.  
 Specifically, this paper satisfies the learning objectives of exploring how current 
environmental policies are created and an understanding of the constitutional challenges and 
barriers to enacting environmental policy. The utilization of a political economic lens provides 
insight into the various power relationships and influence of interests in decision-making 
regarding oil transportation and illustrates the various actors, interests, and institutional factors 
that come to shape the contexts that such decisions are made within. Furthermore, oil 
transportation decisions, such as interprovincial pipelines, reveal the inherent constitutional 
challenges of regulation when two levels of government have various aspects of jurisdictional 
responsibility. These jurisdictional challenges are examined in this paper in terms of the potential 
for provinces to exert their constitutional power over federally regulated pipelines, as well as the 
various regulatory implications of split jurisdiction over spill response. Highlighting the 
jurisdictional battles over oil transportation translates into the broader realm of environmental 
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policy in Canada, thus satisfying my understanding of such constitutional barriers and 
challenges.                   
 In addition to exploring and gaining an understanding of Canadian environmental policy 
a second learning component, energy and oil transportation, and its associated learning 
objectives have been addressed by the completion of this paper. The two learning objectives that 
were fulfilled by this paper were gaining an understanding of oil transportation and examining 
the sustainability of oil transport decisions. The in depth analysis presented in this paper on the 
political economy of oil transportation in Canada has provided a solid understanding of the 
various means of oil transportation, as well as what key factors interact to impact and influence 
such systems. Moreover, by examining the political economic interests surrounding oil 
transportation this paper draws many conclusions and insights into how these transport decisions, 
especially the role of oil pipelines, rate in terms of sustainability and Canada’s future energy 
path. Overall, the role of this paper in fulfilling the requirements of the MES degree is its 
contribution to my learning components, but more so its addition to the knowledge that I have 
gained throughout my studies.  
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Abstract 
 
In Canada, there are currently multiple oil pipeline projects being proposed, engaged in the 
regulatory process, or recently approved with conditions. While debates have focused on the 
environmental effects or environmental injustices of these projects, there is a lack of analysis on 
the overall political economy of oil transportation infrastructure and how interests and power 
relationships shape these debates. The importance of understanding the political economy of oil 
transportation is that pipeline projects have various implications for the future of Canada in terms 
of sustainability, Canada’s energy path, and environmental consequences to be felt by future 
generations. To address the shortage of analysis, this paper provides a modified institutional-
ideological framework applied to a case study of the Energy East Pipeline project to explore the 
current political economy of oil transportation in Canada. The framework comprises of four 
categories: material, physical, and economic factors; normative factors; institutional factors; and 
interests and societal factors. The analysis provides two tentative conclusions suggesting the 
future implications for Canada if the country continues down its current resource-based 
development path. The first is to call for a national energy policy involving a democratic 
opportunity to debate the available energy development options, and the second is to draw 
attention to the opportunities for resistance of the current direction of natural resource 
development in Canada. A choice is to be made regarding which path Canada will choose, with 
pipeline decisions being an important aspect of this choice.     
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Part I Introduction: Oil Transportation Infrastructure in Canada  
 Since the early days of colonization Canada has been extracting and exploiting its 
abundant natural resources starting with the historical fur trade. However, it would be wrong to 
suggest that growth based on natural resources is only a figment of Canada’s historical past. 
Canadian environmental and resource policy has, and continues, to be shaped by the uneven and 
incomplete transition of Canada from a staples economy to a “poststaples” state (Hessing, 
Howlett & Summerville, 2005). Oil is one such resource that is still relied upon for growth of the 
Canadian economy (Isfield, 2013) and has become a hot topic in current Canadian debates, as 
evidenced by front-page news stories on the ways of transporting oil across the country (Lorinc, 
2012), and the environmental consequences of the Alberta tar sands (Berman, 2014). These news 
stories are supplemented by analysis on political (Hoberg, 2013; Winfield, 2012b) and economic 
(CAPP, 2013; Angevine, 2013) debates, suggesting that Canada’s political and economic 
landscape is dominated by emphasis on resource development; one resource particularly, oil 
from the Alberta tar sands. Furthermore, it is important to note that the extraction activities that 
are occurring in Alberta’s Athabasca, Peace River, and Cold Lake areas are referred to as either 
the “oil sands” or the “tar sands.”1  
History of Oil in the Canadian Context  
In 1850, the first oil company in North America was established in Woodstock, Ontario 
after the discovery of seepages of crude oil in and around the auspiciously named towns of Oil 
Springs and Petrolia (Bott, 2012). Following the discovery in Southwestern Ontario, other 
reserves were located around Canada including Turner Valley near Calgary in 1914 and Norman 
Wells in the Northwest Territories in 1920 (Howlett & Brownsey, 2008). Alberta’s future as 
Canada’s oil province arguably was started with the discovery of the Leduc No.1 well in 1947 
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that created conditions for multinational companies to enter into Alberta and set up operations 
(Howlett & Brownsey, 2008). As such, during the 1950’s and 1960’s the Alberta oil industry was 
dominated by the “big four” vertically integrated, multinational companies: Shell, 
Imperial/Exxon, Gulf, and Texaco (Howlett & Brownsey, 2008). By the late 1960’s conventional 
oil reserves were declining, and by the early 1970’s the big four came to the conclusion that there 
were no more large deposits left in Alberta and shifted their attention to frontier areas of the 
Arctic and overseas (Howlett & Brownsey, 2008). Conventional reserves of crude oil have 
continued to decline since then; however, with the advancement of horizontal drilling the 
percentage of recoverable reserves has doubled or even tripled such that anticipated production 
of conventional oil is estimated at 1.4 million barrels per day (CAPP, 2013).              
While the history of conventional oil is important to the overall narrative of the 
establishment of the Canadian oil industry, the real story of Canada’s “oil” success lies in the 
development of the unconventional sources of oil; bitumen from the Alberta tar sands. The 
existence of the tar sands were described back in 1778 when Alexander Mackenzie spoke of the 
“bituminous fountains” and later in 1899 Charles Mair, as part of the Treaty Eight and the Half-
breed Scrip commission, sought out to secure access to the oil reserve by recognizing Aboriginal 
claims through treaty-making (Nikiforuk, 2010). However, extracting bitumen was seen as too 
difficult and costly to extract and it was not until 1964 that an America oil baron entered the 
territory and sought approval to build the first modern open-pit mine, the Great Canadian Oil 
Sands Operation, now known as Suncor, that began production in 1967 (Bott, 2012). 
Nonetheless, the economics of the project were unfavourable, and the Operation subsequently 
lost money for twenty-years by producing the world’s most expensive oil at the time, more than 
$30 a barrel (Nikiforuk, 2010). It was not until the late 1990’s that development in the tar sands 
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exploded and became economically viable due to changes in provincial royalties and federal 
taxes, rising crude oil prices, and the continuing improvements in technology (Bott, 2012). As 
such, the Canadian tar sands are now the largest energy project in the world (Nikiforuk, 2010) 
ranked as the third largest reserve after Venezuela and Saudi Arabia (CAPP, 2012).   
Current Canadian Oil Transportation Infrastructure  
Studies in critical geography and political ecology adopt a conception of crude oil as a 
material flow of commodified nature (Scott, 2012) flowing along six sequential processes of the 
hydrocarbon commodity chain: exploration, extraction/production, refining, distribution, 
consumption, and carbon capture (Bridge, 2008). Of importance to this analysis is the 
distribution, or transportation, link in the commodity chain. Specifically, pipeline debates have 
defined Canadian politics over the past year, with pipeline stories making front page news, 
shaping leaders meetings, and provoking indigenous resistance movements (Scott, 2012). 
However, once a pipeline is built it literally vanishes underground stifling an examination of the 
larger social relationships and power mechanisms at play (Scott, 2012). Arguably, the hidden 
elements of oil transportation make it an under appreciated part of the hydrocarbon commodity 
chain, despite the defining role in continuing the material flow from production to consumption 
and defining the path dependency of energy strategies and future developments (Scott, 2012).   
There are three options available for continental travel of oil across Canada: pipeline, rail, 
and truck. The most popular and preferred method of transportation is by pipeline due to the 
perceived efficiency (Makholm, 2012) and lowest average cost of transporting large volumes of 
crude (Dawson & Bartucci, 2012). The first major piece of Canadian oil transportation 
infrastructure, the Interprovincial Pipeline, was built in 1950 to move crude oil from Edmonton 
to Superior, Wisconsin, and at the time was the largest single-season pipeline construction 
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project worldwide (Bott, 2012). During the 1950’s pipeline debates were divided along those 
who believed pipelines should be built exclusively within Canada and serve Canadian markets, 
and others who were of the opinion that Canadian markets should be served only by domestic 
sources with pipelines built along the cheapest routes, requiring the inclusion of a United States 
(U.S.) export component (Doern & Toner, 1985). As a result of these debates, the Canadian 
pipeline projects that were approved between 1949 and 1961 entailed both elements and were 
characterized by a “quasi-national” or “semi-continental” patterns of transportation (Doern & 
Toner, 1985).     
When discussing the current systems of oil pipelines in Canada, it is important not to 
confuse the systems with a network, as every pipeline has to some extent, its own definitive 
function (Makholm, 2012) Currently, there are four major oil pipelines that move oil from 
Alberta to markets in British Columbia, Eastern Canada, and the United States: Enbridge 
Mainline, the Kinder Morgan TransMountain Pipeline, the Spectra Express Pipeline, and the 
TransCanada Keystone Pipeline (Angevine, 2013). The current total capacity available on 
Canadian oil pipelines is 3,671,000 barrels per day (bpd)2 (CAPP, 2013). In addition to the 
existing infrastructure, there are several proposals in place to increase the pipeline systems both 
in terms of new pipelines and increasing capacity to older lines.  
The Keystone XL Pipeline is a project meant to transport oil from Alberta to the U.S. 
Gulf coast (830,000 bpd); however, climate change has emerged as a prominent thorn in the side 
of the project and has created tensions in Canada-U.S. relations (Hoberg, 2013). Two pipeline 
proposals are aimed at moving oil from Alberta to the British Columbia (B.C.) coast, the 
Northern Gateway Pipeline (525,000 bpd) that has strong opposition stemming from the 
environmental risk concentrated in British Columbia and economic benefits concentrated in 
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Alberta (recently granted federal approval) and the Trans Mountain expansion that involves 
twinning an existing pipeline with a capacity of 540,000 bpd and increasing the capacity on the 
old line by 50,000 bpd (Hoberg, 2013). In addition, two pipelines are projected to transport 
Canadian bitumen east, the Line 9 Pipeline (recently approved) from Ontario to Quebec (300,000 
bpd), and the Energy East Pipeline from Alberta to Atlantic Canada (1.1 million bpd) (Hoberg, 
2013). Combined, these expansion and new infrastructure projects will double the transportation 
capacity of Canadian oil pipelines.  
Although pipelines transport the majority of oil throughout Canada, lately the amount of 
oil being transported by rail has also increased. Over the past five years, there has been a 
substantial increase in the shipping of petroleum products on Canadian railways, from 500 
carloads in 2009 to a projected 130,000 carloads in 2013 (Winfield, 2013). This past February, 
within one month 12,989 rail cars were loaded with oil, a sixty percent increase from February 
2012 (CAPP, 2013). The benefit of rail is that extensive infrastructure is already in place that 
allows producers flexibility in reaching markets that they desire (CAPP, 2013). A deadly 
consequence of the increase in rail traffic was evidenced in July 2013 when a train derailed in 
Lac-Mégantic killing forty-seven people as a consequence of North American railway operators 
engaging in cutthroat competition to cut costs and increase profits by any means possible among 
other regulatory and safety failures (Winfield, 2013). In addition to pipelines and rail, trucks can 
also be used to transport oil to markets, although the use of trucks is much less common than rail 
and pipeline. However, one Alberta trucking company, Gibson Energy Inc., hauls roughly 
250,000 barrels of energy product per day (Angevine, 2013), illustrating that the Canadian oil 
transportation story is complex and entails multiple modes of transportation, each with their own 
political economic relationships.  
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Regulation and Liability of Oil Transportation Infrastructure in Canada  
 Canada oil transportation regulation for oil pipelines is established at both the provincial 
and federal level. On the one hand, each province has its own legislation surrounding pipelines 
that stay within provincial boundaries, while on the other hand the federal government has 
authority over pipelines that are interprovincial or cross national boundaries (CEPA, 2012). 
Regulators are responsible for ensuring that companies meet all regulations for the safety of 
employees, the public, and the environment throughout all phases of the life of the pipeline, 
including the design, construction, operation, maintenance, and abandonment (CEPA, 2012). The 
federal regulator of oil pipelines is the National Energy Board (NEB). The NEB was established 
in 1959 with the purpose of advising the government on broad energy matters, as well as to serve 
as regulator of oil and gas pipelines and the export of oil, gas, and electricity (Doern & Gattinger, 
2003). While the NEB has the power to prosecute and impose fines on companies that break 
federal rules, records from the NEB reveal that the Board generally responds to cases involving 
spills and ruptures with mere warnings to the companies and orders to fix defects (De Souza, 
2014) rather than responding with stricter measures.  An example of a provincial regulator is the 
Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) that was created as part of the Responsible Energy 
Development Act (REDA) in 2012 and that operates at arm’s length from the Government of 
Alberta (Alberta Energy Regulator, 2014). Under the AER, 415,000 kilometres (km) of pipeline 
are regulated throughout the province (Alberta Energy Regulator, 2014).    
 While the federal and provincial regulators are responsible for ensuring company 
compliance on matters of safety, it has been unclear who is liable and responsible in the event of 
a spill or rupture, especially when the pipeline is federally regulated yet spills on provincial lands 
or in provincial waters. A review of land-based spill response and preparedness in British 
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Columbia outlines that “oversight of spill preparedness, response and recovery involves 
provincial, as well as federal agencies in a complex matrix of regulations and policies”(Ministry 
of Environment, 2014). While it is important that each agency has the proper rules and regulation 
in place, it is also important that unnecessary duplication of such regulations is avoided (Ministry 
of Environment, 2014). New changes to the federal pipeline regime have made it such that 
pipeline companies will be liable for all costs and damages related to oil spills, regardless of 
whether they are at fault; furthermore, companies will be required to have a minimum amount of 
cash available to pay cleanup costs (The Canadian Press, 2014). The changes are in response to 
the need to clarify the confusing and complex patchwork of regulations surrounding liability 
(The Canadian Press, 2014). Company liability is said to follow the principle of the polluter 
pays, whereby “the costs of addressing risk should be the responsibility of those industries that 
bring the risk, and not the communities that bear it” (Ministry of Environment, 2014). However, 
the full liability of the pipeline companies is only in terms of federally regulated pipelines, 
leaving decisions regarding the liability of spills on provincially regulated pipelines uncertain, 
such that there is no uniform approach to addressing the liability of pipeline spills across the 
country.    
 Rail regulations follow a similar structure in that the federal government has authority 
over rail that is interprovincial and provinces are responsible for rail regulation within their own 
provincial borders. The federal authority responsible for rail transportation is Transport Canada 
with over thirty railway companies under federal jurisdiction including the Canadian National 
(CN) Railway Company and the Canadian Pacific (CP) Railway Company (Government of 
Canada, 2012). On a provincial level, though each province has its own railway legislation (with 
the exception of Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island) the provinces still rely on Transport 
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Canada to inspect and recommend actions with regards to safety (Government of Canada, 2012). 
While Transport Canada inspects and makes recommendations the provinces exercise 
jurisdiction over enforcement of the legislation with three exceptions, British Columbia conducts 
its own inspections, Saskatchewan has not made use of Transport Canada’s services, and in 
Ontario Transport Canada conducts both inspection and enforcement tasks (Government of 
Canada, 2012).  
In addition, Transport Canada is responsible for the regulatory oversight of domestic and 
international shipping of dangerous goods (the federal government has classified oil as a 
dangerous product) via road, rail, air, and marine transportation set out in the Transportation of 
Dangerous Goods Act, 1992 (Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2011). Similar to the 
regulation of oil pipelines, the regulation of rail is far from perfect and gaps in the regulation 
have been identified. In a report released by the Auditor General in 2011, it was concluded that 
“Transport Canada has not designed and implemented the management practices needed to 
effectively monitor regulatory compliance with the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, 
1992” and that there is no national risk-based compliance inspection plan (Office of the Auditor 
General of Canada, 2011). Furthermore, in the case of a rail accident, Canada's Transportation 
Safety Board is charged with identifying the causes of rail accidents; however Mark Winfield 
following the Lac-Mégantic disaster, argues, “its mandate may be too narrow to address the 
wider questions about the federal government's approach to public-safety regulation” referring to 
the emphasis on “partnerships” with regulated entities (Winfield, 2013). Both pipeline and rail 
regulation highlight the challenge of interprovincial transportation systems and a need for 
improved regulations in terms of public and environmental safety.  
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This paper is structured around a current analysis of the political economy of oil 
transportation infrastructure in Canada with recognition of the historical basis of decision-
making, alongside an examination into the broader implications of expanding the oil 
infrastructure systems on the Canadian oil industry and future paths of energy development. Part 
I provides an overview and introduction of the development of the oil industry in Canada and the 
current oil transportation infrastructure available, along with oil transportation regulations. The 
introduction provides the context for a consideration of how oil transportation infrastructure, 
especially pipelines, encompasses its own political economy. Part II provides the analytical 
framework that will be used throughout this analysis and develops the four factors that will be 
examined in detail: material, physical, and economic factors; normative factors; institutional 
factors; and interests and societal factors. Part II also establishes background information on the 
case study used in applying the analysis, TransCanada’s Energy East Pipeline project. Part III is 
an application of the analytical framework, organized around the aforementioned four factors 
and divided into subsections divulging into the case study and exploring the various power 
relationships that exist within the political economy of oil transportation. The fourth and final 
section, Part IV, provides conclusions on the lessons learned from the analysis and suggests 
future responses to the oil transportation debates that have taken hold of Canada.     
Part II Analytical Framework: Institutional-Ideological Approach  
Institutional-Ideological Analytical Framework  
 Research of Canadian government, politics, and political economy tend to overlook 
environmental policy (Winfield, 2012a). Furthermore, analysis on the Canadian oil sector focus 
predominately on the environmental consequences of the Alberta tar sands with very little 
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attention paid to the transportation infrastructure that makes development possible. Moreover, 
discussions of oil transportation in Canada primarily focus on pipeline safety and spill risk, only 
recently has the connection been made between transportation infrastructure and tar sands 
expansion (Scott, 2013a; Nikiforuk, 2010; Hoberg, 2013). Yet even within these discussions, 
there lacks a comprehensive analysis of the overarching interests and factors at play that are 
shaping the political economic landscape of oil transportation in Canada.   
One such analysis that explores the political economy of pipelines is Jeff Makholm’s 
(2012) history of the pipeline transport industry (both oil and natural gas) in the United States 
over the last century.  Makholm argues that a neoclassical economic model that focuses on 
technology and costs, rational choice, and equilibrium does little in the way of explaining the oil 
transport industry, specifically pipelines (Makholm, 2012). As a result of the failure of 
neoclassical economics, Makholm (2012) points out the importance of using new institutional 
economics to explain markets, market behaviour, regulation, and competitive entry in the 
pipelines industry.  Furthermore, he uses a new institutional economic model to explore the 
development and regulation of pipelines in the United States drawing upon the institutional, 
regional, and political histories, and their influence in shaping the pipeline transport market. 
While Makholm’s institutional economic model is valuable in analyzing pipelines, his work is 
based on American pipeline systems and does not fully translate into the Canadian context due to 
different realities and histories. As a result, this analysis will provide a look into the Canada oil 
transportation structure, as well as adding the useful element of a contemporary case study to 
direct and focus the analysis, an aspect missing in Makholm’s historical review.    
This analysis will focus on the political economy of oil transportation in order to explore 
the intersection of politics and the economy in order to gain an understanding of the current 
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transportation infrastructure surrounding oil in Canada, as well as the implications of such 
systems upon the broader theme of tar sands expansion. Political economic relationships are built 
on interests, the interests of political and economic actors. The importance of these actors, 
according to G. Bruce Doern and Glen Toner (1985), is that these actors have the capacity to 
exercise power in terms of the ability to act in order to achieve their objectives. Central to this 
analysis is an understanding of the different interests that surround the oil transportation debates 
and how these interests interact with, and influence one another. Moreover, it is not merely a 
matter of identifying different interests and power relationships, but evaluating the processes that 
guide these interests. It is these interests that will compete to have their views and opinions 
represented, the successful interests will have profound implications on the future landscape of 
Canadian oil transportation and the fate of the Canadian tar sands.  
The analytical framework that will be employed for this analysis is modeled after the 
institutional-ideological approach utilized by Mark S. Winfield in his political economic 
investigation of environmental policy in Ontario (Winfield, 2012a). Winfield’s framework 
expands upon the institutional-ideological approach developed by Doern and Toner (1985) for 
their analysis of the Canadian National Energy Plan (NEP). Winfield’s framework focuses on 
four categories of factors that are seen as influential in the development and shaping of interests. 
These factors include material, physical, and economic factors; normative factors; institutional 
factors; and societal factors (Winfield, 2012a). Exploring each of these factors is key due to the 
complexity of interests, for interests are economic but also entail social, technical, ideological, 
and political aspects (Hessing & Howlett, 1997). However, while Winfield utilized his analysis 
on the broader aspects of environmental policy, this analysis is narrower in focus and will 
provide an analysis concentrated on a specific issue within environmental policy.   
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  An institutional-ideological policy framework is useful in exploring oil transportation 
infrastructure in Canada, for the transportation of resources exist in an intricate arena with 
multiple stakeholders and competing ideas. Furthermore, it is not simply enough to examine oil 
transportation from only one of the factors included within the framework since each factor is 
intricately tied to another factor. For instance, the institutional factor of federalism influence 
interests involved in the physical distribution of resources, especially across provincial 
boundaries, which in essence implicates normative factors of the distribution of risks and equity 
and the notion of national interests. The main benefit of an institutional-ideological framework is 
that it combines multiple models of policy analysis; therefore, constituting a better attempt at 
encapsulating the complexity of policy making and identification of who is benefiting and who is 
suffering at the hands of policy and resource-use decisions. 
The institutional-ideological framework of Winfield has been modified to reflect the 
factors as they relate to oil transportation infrastructure in Canada, shown in Figure 1, and will be 
used for this analysis. Winfield, as with Makholm, focuses on a historical approach, whereas this 
analysis takes a primarily present-day approach, although in certain circumstances the historical 
basis of decisions is acknowledged. It is important to recognize the historical context that current 
debates are situated for example, the history of built infrastructure entails fixed, physical 
structures that determine the routes of resource flows and shape the available options for new 
infrastructure (Scott, 2013a). Due to the current interest surrounding the topic, especially the 
numerous pipeline debates, this analysis is well timed to serve as a way of understanding the 
political economy of oil transportation in Canada and its connections to larger environmental 
issues such as tar sands expansion and future energy developments. In terms of material, 
physical, and economic factors, these factors require consideration for they present important 
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realities that cannot be overlooked and shape the Canadian context for which oil transportation is 
situated. Doern and Toner (1985) outlined several aspects of material, physical, and economic 
factors in their analysis of the NEP that are relevant to this endeavor including: spatial and 
geographic realities, the proximity to markets, the transportation and distribution of resources, 
and Canada’s location in the global economy. These factors are relevant in providing a 
foundation upon which other factors must be acknowledged. For example, the geographic 
realities of the location of the oil that requires transportation, and where the oil needs to be 
transported have larger implications such as which actors become involved, especially in terms 
of triggering provincial interests.     
Normative factors include general ideologies and dominant ideas (Doern & Toner, 1985) 
that inform ideas about the role of the state and concepts surrounding a given issue (Winfield, 
2012a). For the purpose of this analysis, six ideas and ideologies have been chosen to explore 
regarding in what way these ideas play a role in how oil transportation is currently understood 
and responded to. The ideas and ideologies that will be examined incorporate ideas of the 
distribution of risks and equity, the duty to consult, the ideology of responsible and 
representative government, notions of national interest, sustainable development, and market 
liberalism. Just as resources are not equally distributed geographically, risks and rewards of 
certain development projects, or transportation routes, are also not equally distributed. The 
distribution of risks involves environmental as well as social elements, such as who benefits 
from certain projects and who can have their voices heard, as aspect inherent in the duty to 
consult. Furthermore, the idea of projects and development being in the name of the national 
interest require further scrutiny, for there are many different notions of what the national interest 
may entail. Finally, ideologies of sustainable development and market liberalism influence the 
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path of development and it is important to determine which interests are active in promoting 
these various ideologies.       
The third part of the framework explores the institutional factors that form the structural 
basis of power. These include the division of power in a cabinet-parliamentary government, the 
structure of federalism, and Aboriginal rights. Important considerations regarding institutional 
factors include the constitutional division of powers and the strong jurisdictional position of 
provincial governments with respect to the environment and natural resources, as well as the 
high levels of executive autonomy of majority governments (Doern & Toner, 1985; Winfield, 
2012a). Furthermore, when exploring institutional factors it is important to look historically in 
order to cast comparisons with the current institutional structures. For example, the current 
federal government under Prime Minster Harper has been able to espouse a great deal of power 
in terms of negating advancements in environmental policy and paving the way for natural 
resource development. While at the same time, Aboriginal interests have also become a forefront 
for contestation and legal battles to a greater extent than in the past.    
The final component of the analytical framework includes societal factors; these are the 
impacts of public opinions, the changing power positions of non-state actors, and the role of the 
media in framing and drawing attention to issues (Winfield, 2012a). The analysis will thus focus 
on public opinion, advocacy groups, the media, and corporate interests. Winfield (2012a) noted 
that a weakness of Doern and Toner’s framework was its failure to differentiate between the 
roles of state and non-state actors while neglecting other factors outside of the state; Winfield 
accounted for these in his modified framework. The current framework also includes these 
elements for there exists many important interests that are non-state, yet can have a heavy 
influence on state action. Specifically, corporate interests, and to a certain extent advocacy 
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groups (which include First Nations, non-government organizations (NGOs), and unions) play a 
significant role in terms of imposing their interests onto government. Furthermore, the way that 
the media shapes certain issues can influence how the debates transpire and can also influence 
public opinion, which itself can be a large catalyst for change.    
The following section will employ this institutional ideological framework in assessing 
the current Canadian oil transportation infrastructure and analyzing the political economy of 
these systems. Furthermore, using the currently proposed pipeline project, TransCanada’s 
Energy East Pipeline, as a case study will create a lens for which to view the various factors, and 
further an understanding of the larger implications oil transportation will have on the Canadian 
tar sands. As such, each factor will be explored in general terms of oil transportation followed by 
an application of the factor in relation to the Energy East Pipeline.     
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Case Study: TransCanada’s Energy East Pipeline Project  
The proposed pipeline, known as Energy East, is a west-to-east pipeline championed by 
the company TransCanada. According to the company, the pipeline would extend 4,500 
kilometres from Alberta and Saskatchewan to refineries in Eastern Canada with a capacity of 1.1 
million barrels of crude oil per day (TransCanada, 2014a). The project consists of converting 
close to 3,000km of an existing natural gas pipeline to oil service, and constructing 1,500km of 
new pipeline (TransCanada, 2014b). With a declining demand from the United States markets, 
continental demand for Canadian supplies have decreased and thus Canadian oil sells at a 
discounted price; this loss in revenue creates pressure to access the global market in order to 
receive world prices for Canadian product (Hoberg, 2013). Energy East is one of five pipeline 
projects that are directed at removing the transportation bottleneck that is occurring in the 
Alberta tar sands due to the decline in continental demand, with the further goal of accessing 
tidewaters that lead to global markets. The other pipeline projects include Keystone XL, 
Northern Gateway (recently approved), Line 9 Reversal (recently approved), and the Trans 
Mountain Expansion. 
Part III Analysis: Oil Transportation and Energy East  
This section will employ an application of the established framework exploring the 
political economy of oil transportation in Canada using TransCanada’s Energy East Pipeline 
project as a contemporary case study. The analysis will work through the four factors: material, 
physical, and economic factors; normative factors; institutional factors; and interests and societal 
factors, with each element broken down into various ideas, interests, and realities that contribute 
to the factor. In addition to applying the aspects to oil transportation infrastructure, the analysis 
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will also take a broader look at how oil transportation infrastructure interacts with expansion in 
the tar sands and the path of natural resource development in Canada.   
A. Material/Physical/Economic Factors  
Spatial/Geographic Realities  
The spatial and geographic realities lay the foundation for much of the political economic 
tensions and discussions surrounding the transportation of oil from the tar sands. Philippe Le 
Billon (2001) makes a clear observation; “the business of resource extraction has thus one 
specific characteristic: it cannot choose where the resources are” (p. 569). Furthermore, the 
business of resource transportation also follows this characteristic in that if you cannot choose 
where the resources are then you cannot choose where the transportation systems begin; the 
choice therefore lies in choosing the path that it will take and where it will end.       
When it comes to natural resources in Canada there has commonly been a historical 
tension between the regional areas that produce the resource and the region that consumes the 
resource. This relationship is not unique to the Canadian experience, when exploring 
environmental history and accounts of the transition to a capitalism-based economy there are 
discussions of the “core-periphery polarization” (Moore, 2003). This polarization refers to the 
development of resources in the periphery, farmland and the countryside, in order for 
consumption in the core, what would be city centres and places of urbanization. While some 
scholars saw the staples based economy as a transitional stage, Harold Innis the economic 
historian, believed that natural resource communities would increasingly become economically 
dependent on the populated centres (Ali, 2009). Furthermore, the precariousness of dependence 
on natural resources would not allow the economy to mature or develop itself in a permanent 
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manner (Ali, 2009). While this core-periphery polarization occurs around Canada, more 
importantly is the spatial separation of resources and consumers within Canada.  
 Within Canada the major population concentrations are in the Eastern provinces of 
Ontario and Quebec, while energy sources are located in the less populated Western provinces 
(Doern & Gattinger, 2003). Especially in terms of oil, the spatial realities of where oil is located 
dictates how and where oil is transported. In order to understand the impacts on the geographic 
realities of oil on transportation infrastructure it is important to explore the uneven distribution of 
the resource across the nation.  
 In 2012, Canadian production of crude oil, combining conventional and unconventional 
production (tar sands) was over 3.2 million barrels per day (CAPP, 2013). Of those 3.2 million 
barrels, only six percent came from Eastern Canada (200,000 bpd) and the remainder was 
produced in Western Canada, more specifically the province of Alberta (CAPP, 2013). The 
unequal distribution of oil resources is forecasted to increase with the production of the tar sands, 
with estimates placing total Canadian oil production at 6.7 million bpd in 2030, with 6.6 million 
barrels coming out of Alberta, a contribution of over ninety-eight percent of total production 
(CAPP, 2013).  
 While the resources are unequally distributed across Canada, another spatial and 
geographic reality of the country is its geographic size and how it influences transportation 
systems. For example, the spatial realities involved in the Energy East Pipeline project include its 
sheer size due to having to traverse across Canada to the Eastern provinces in order to reach 
coastal waters in New Brunswick and the St. Lawrence River in Quebec. Since the distance 
between Alberta and New Brunswick is so vast, the Energy East Pipeline will require 4,500km 
of mainline pipeline (TransCanada, 2014b). The spatial size of the project can be best realized in 
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comparison to the recently approved Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline that will connect 
Alberta to Northern British Columbia at a distance of 1,177km (Enbridge, 2014).  
Proximity to Markets  
 The implications of the location of the Alberta tar sands are significant in understanding 
the oil transportation infrastructure. One of the factors that play into the shaping of the 
transportation systems are where the resources are located in terms of the location to the markets 
that are looking to purchase the resource. Simply looking at a map of Canada it is clear to see 
that Alberta is surrounded on either side by two other provinces  (British Columbia and 
Saskatchewan) with its southern border connected to the United States. The geographic 
placement of the Alberta tar sands, encompassing the Athabasca, Peace River, and Cold Lake, 
has two major impacts on the proximity to markets. The first is that the continental U.S. has 
historically been the largest export market for Canadian oil, the second impact is that Alberta 
itself does not have access to tidewaters in order to directly transport resources across the ocean 
to other countries.   
 The United States has long been the destination of Canadian resources, especially energy 
resources. Due to their proximity, Canadian oil is easily transported continentally into the U.S. 
making Canada the top foreign supplier of crude oil to the United States (CAPP, 2013). The 
relationship between Canada and the U.S. in terms of its energy markets has been described as 
integrated and interdependent since the mid-1980s (Gattinger, 2010). With statements made such 
as “Canadian energy decisions are almost always simultaneously American decisions” (Doern & 
Gattinger, 2003, p.23).  
However, the relationship with the U.S. concerning its market for oil is changing. With 
the increased production of U.S. shale oil reserves, the United States is looking for its own 
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energy security in terms of domestic supply. A recent report issued by the International Energy 
Agency (IEP) concludes that the U.S. is moving steadily towards energy self-sufficiency, and 
will be able to meet all of its energy needs from domestic resources by 2035 (International 
Energy Agency, 2013). Furthermore, U.S. demand for oil imports is expected to decline from 
fifty percent of total consumption to thirty-five percent within the same time period (Dawson & 
Bartucci, 2012). Due to the foreseeable future of U.S. declining demand for Canadian oil imports 
the search for markets beyond the United States has become a focal point of tar sands promoters. 
In addition to the increased U.S. production there is also a mounting trend to oppose “dirty” 
Canadian tar sands oil in the U.S. due to its climatic consequences (Gattinger, 2010). Climate 
change issues have been at the top of the political debate regarding a decision to approve the 
Keystone XL pipeline in the U.S. with President Obama focusing on curbing carbon emissions3 
(Koring, 2014).  
If the pace of development in the tar sands is to continue and increase, new markets need 
to be explored for Canadian exports. China and India are two of the fastest growing economies 
globally, and as such, their demand for oil is tied to their economic growth (CAPP, 2013) 
making these markets ideal targets for Canadian exports. Yet while Chinese interest may exist 
for Canadian tar sands oil, there are mounting frustrations in China regarding the delays in being 
able to access the oil (Wheeler, 2012). As mentioned previously, Alberta has no direct access to 
coastal waters, thus market diversification ultimately rests on infrastructure that can transport 
Alberta tar sands bitumen to one of the Canadian coasts, with the intention of shipping the oil to 
the growing Asian markets. As stated by Angevine (2013), pipelines to Quebec and New 
Brunswick (referring to Energy East) “would allow western oil to reach refineries located at 
tidewater sites, and allow crude oil or refined petroleum products to be exported to PADD I 
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[U.S. East Coast], Europe, or Asia.” As such, TransCanada’s Energy East project includes the 
construction of two marine terminals, the Cacouna marine terminal along the St. Lawrence River 
in Quebec and the New Brunswick Saint John marine terminal on the Bay of Fundy 
(TransCanada, 2014b). The project also includes delivery points at three existing refineries in 
Eastern Canada including two refineries in Quebec, one in Montreal (Suncor) and the other in 
Lévis (Valero) (TransCanada, 2014b). The third refinery is assumed to be Irving Oil’s refinery in 
New Brunswick since Irving Oil is one of the listed proponents of the project (TransCanada, 
2014b); however, there is no direct mention of this refinery in the project description. Based on 
TransCanada’s description, the assumption is that the crude will be refined at the three Eastern 
Canada locations and then the value-added products will be transported via tankers from the two 
marine terminals to world markets, or used to provide resource security to Eastern Canada. 
However, the refining capacity in Eastern Canada to handle large volumes of western heavy 
crude oil is questionable, as will be explored in the subsequent section.  
Transportation/Distribution of Resources  
 As previously mentioned there is an unequal distribution of natural resources across 
Canada, especially in terms of oil. This distribution heavily influences the transportation systems 
and infrastructure that is used in moving the resource from one place to another. With the 
concentration of oil in the Alberta tar sands region, it is not surprising that the concentration of 
transportation infrastructure, especially oil pipelines is also heavily populated within the region 
as well. Furthermore, another element to consider when discussing the distribution of resources 
related to the tar sands is the distribution of refining capacity to transform the heavy crude into 
products that can be used for consumption.   
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 One of the most common ways to transport oil across Canada is by continental oil 
pipeline. As mentioned previously, a majority of the pipeline systems connect Alberta to the 
United States, with little pipeline capacity installed to transport oil solely throughout Canada. 
The question for industry and government quickly becomes, is there enough pipeline capacity to 
meet demand. A report released by the National Energy Board in 2008 looked to answer this 
question by reporting on the Canadian pipeline transportation systems and revealed that there 
was some spare capacity on some pipeline systems, yet the “market’s view is that additional 
capacity is required to accommodate growing supply and to provide greater market flexibility” 
(2008). The growing supply is due to an intensification of tar sands development and unchecked 
expansion that is outpacing the existing infrastructure.  
 The “market’s view” is based on the apparent pipeline bottleneck that is occurring. The 
bottleneck has been claimed to forgo $50 million a day in profits on the Canadian oil that 
exported to the U.S. (Leach, 2013). According to the oil industry, the bottleneck is said to occur 
because oil is being transported into landlocked areas (such as Cushing, Oklahoma) with limited 
capacity to move the oil to the coast, to access tidewaters, where it could be sold at world prices 
(Spears, 2013). The “glut” in the Midwestern U.S., where a majority of Canadian crude is 
transported, results in a persistent price differential between prices in Western North America 
(reflected in the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) index) and international oil prices (reflected in 
the Brent Crude index) (Hoberg, 2013). Thus, if Canadian oil supplies could be transported to 
areas with access to tidewater the rationale is that Canadian producers would be able to achieve 
world prices, thereby maximizing profits.  
 The Energy East Pipeline is targeted at alleviating the infrastructure bottleneck and 
transporting western crude east, rather than south into the already saturated United States. In 
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addition to the pipeline, the Energy East project also includes the construction of two marine 
terminals. The Cacouna marine terminal will be located along the eastern shore of the St. 
Lawrence River in Quebec, and the second terminal will be in Saint John, New Brunswick on the 
western shore of the Bay of Fundy (TransCanada, 2014b). The two marine terminals will 
facilitate the export of Canadian heavy crude to global energy markets.  
 In addition to transportation of oil by pipeline, oil is also moved around North America 
through extensive rail networks. Recently, rail is becoming a more popular transportation option 
with 13,000 car loads of oil per month in 2013, double the monthly average during the 2000 to 
2010 period (Angevine, 2013). One of the reasons why railroads are becoming increasingly 
relied upon is cited as being a lack of available pipeline capacity and the need for rail 
infrastructure to contribute to the transportation of oil (Vanderklippe, 2013a). Not only is a lack 
of capacity increasing rail traffic of oil products, but rail has its own inherent advantages. The 
advantages of rail include the fact that the railroad network throughout North America is 
extensive and rail lines already run close to refineries and shipping terminals, new rail 
infrastructure can be built more quickly than pipelines, and there is less financial risk to shippers 
due to not requiring long-term contracts (Angevine, 2013). Typically transporting oil by rail is 
more expensive than shipments made by pipeline; however, the cost differential between rail and 
pipeline may become less significant as the cost of moving oil on Canadian pipelines increases 
(Lewis, 2014a). In five years the cost has risen sixty percent (Lewis, 2014a), whereby a barrel of 
diluted bitumen is transported at a cost of $7 via pipeline, compared with $6 to $8 via rail 
(Hussain, 2012). The rise in pipeline costs is mostly attributable to system expansions that are 
becoming more expensive (Lewis, 2014a).   
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However, transporting oil by rail is accompanied by a whole set of safety and spill risks. 
The Lac-Mégantic rail disaster from last summer in Quebec still stands out as a reason to cause 
pause to the expansion of rail transportation of hazardous materials, including oil. The train 
involved in the Lac-Mégantic disaster was carrying 7.6 million litres (L) of volatile crude oil 
when it derailed and exploded on July 6, 2013, killing forty-seven people (Cheadle, 2013). The 
Lac-Mégantic tragedy was the catalyst for a larger critique of the safety of the transportation of 
hazardous materials via rail. Although according to Winfield (2013) a series of failures on the 
part of railway operators and the safety regulator, Transport Canada, had been occurring for 
years and some form of major rail accident was virtually inevitable. The series of failures that 
culminated in the Lac-Mégantic disaster included Transport Canada failing to respond to the 
major change in the kinds of traffic moving over the railway network associated with the 
increased shipment of petroleum products, failure to address well-known issues around the safety 
of older tank cars being used to carry the bulk of the increased shipments, and general long-term 
failures to ensure that adequate regulatory controls were in place to make sure that trains 
carrying dangerous goods were operated safely and parked securely (Winfield, 2013).  
In addition to casting light on the regulatory failures of rail transportation, the disaster 
served to encourage commentators to use the tragedy to advocate for the expedited approval of 
pipeline projects (Scott, 2013b). However, according to Dayna Scott (2013b) the federal 
government itself created the conditions under which rail companies could cash in on the 
pipeline bottlenecks, and instead of using the disaster to promote pipelines she advocates for 
using the disaster to highlight the need for a national oil-transport plan, one that weighs the risks 
and benefits associated with different infrastructure choices and routes. So while rail may be a 
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viable option for oil transportation it too is subject to the same concerns of safety risks and spills 
that face pipelines, as well as the larger debates around tar sands expansion.    
A final aspect to explore in terms of the distribution of resources is the available refining 
capacity to create the value added goods that are sold on the markets. The Canadian distribution 
of refining capacity is divided between Western and Eastern Canada with a total capacity of 
nearly two million bpd of crude oil (CAPP, 2013). In 2012, Canadian refineries processed 
897,000 bpd of heavy western crude, while the remaining seventy-two percent of available 
supplies were exported (CAPP, 2013). The distributional differences lie in the type of crude that 
is refined. In Western Canada, the eight refineries refine oil that is solely sourced from Western 
Canada, while in Eastern Canada, western crude accounted for only twenty-nice percent of total 
refinery demand (CAPP, 2013).  
As for the Energy East Pipeline and its intended end points, a recent report published in 
partnership between the Council of Canadians, Ecology Action Centre, Environmental Defence, 
and Équiterre suggests that Energy East is destined as an export pipeline; not for domestic 
refinement as suggested by TransCanada (Council of Canadians et al., 2014). Their analysis 
reveals that the three refineries along the pipeline path have a combined refining capacity of 
672,000 bpd, of that total a projected 550,000 bpd are already available from sources such as 
United States imports, Eastern Canada offshore supplies, and the newly approved Enbridge Line 
9B Reversal and Line 9 Capacity Expansion Project (Council of Canadians et al., 2014). Taking 
into account the existing supply of crude that is available to these refineries, a mere 122,000 bpd 
is the remaining capacity of the Eastern refineries, leading to the ultimate conclusion that the 
remaining 978,000 bpd from the Energy East Pipeline will be available for immediate export in 
raw form (Council of Canadians et al., 2014). Solidifying the result of the report, a plant manager 
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from Irving Oil has stated that the capacity of the pipeline is “way more than we would ever use 
at this refinery, so the bulk of it would all be exported” (Lewis, 2013a). Due to the characteristics 
of the western heavy crude that is coming out of Alberta more complex refineries are required, 
refineries that have the ability to process heavy crude oil (Canadian Fuels Association, 2013). 
This complex refining capacity is not located along the proposed pipeline route. Therefore, it is 
expected that the heavy crude transported through Energy East will be destined for areas that 
have heavy crude refining capabilities.  
Canada’s Location in the Global Economy  
 It would be misleading to not include a brief discussion of how Canada fits into the larger 
political economic relationships on a global scale, for these processes play a role in shaping the 
transportation destination of resources across the country. Glen Norcliffe (2001), in examining 
how Canada’s relations in the global economy have been socially construed, emphasizes that 
Canada’s engagement with the global economy began five centuries ago as a minor element of 
European imperial strategies. Indeed, the nation still remains highly involved with the global 
economy today as it was in the past with immigration, trade, and foreign direct investment 
statistics indicating that few nations have been integrated more profoundly into the global 
economy than has Canada (Norcliffe, 2001). In the global economy Canada’s role, as it was 
historically, is as an exporter and producer of natural resources demonstrated through being one 
of the largest exporters of natural resources throughout the twentieth century (Hessing, Howlett 
& Summerville, 2005).  
A large majority of Canadian natural resource exports include energy such as oil; in so 
much as in 2003 the country had a trade surplus of $41.3 billion from energy exports alone 
(Hessing, Howlett & Summerville, 2005). This export mentality has been engrained in Canada’s 
                                                                                  Political Economy of Oil Transportation                        27
global relations dating back to 1988 with the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and subsequent 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Gattinger, 2010). While NAFTA has been the 
most important trade agreement in the past due to the U.S. being Canada’s largest trading 
partner, changes in the global economy may see the rise of other arrangements (Dawson & 
Bartucci, 2012). Canada is currently negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that will 
provide opportunities to negotiate new market access with Asian countries; in effect providing 
Canadian energy producers to growing markets for export (Dawson & Bartucci, 2012). With 
such a heavy reliance on exports, that is projected to continue based on Canada’s new trade 
negotiations, transportation infrastructure geared towards moving energy products out of the 
country in order to continue to contribute to the export orientation of the nation is paramount. 
According to environmental groups, Energy East is intended as an export pipeline with most of 
the pipeline’s oil to be exported unrefined to global energy markets (Council of Canadians et al., 
2014). Therefore, the Energy East Pipeline, if built, is one such project that will serve to maintain 
the export-driven resource exploitation model of Canada within the global energy political 
economy. 
B. Normative Factors  
Distribution of Risks and Equity  
 The dominant idea surrounding the distribution of risks and equity is tied up in the larger 
utilization of interests. As Doern and Toner (1985) point out, ideologies and dominant ideas are 
“central to the very definition of both the ends and the means of energy politics” (p.17). In the 
case of oil transportation the ends include the final destination of the oil and the market price that 
can be fetched for the product. Meanwhile, the means encompass the route of transportation, the 
various communities along the path, and the type of transportation infrastructure that is chosen. 
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Inherent in a transportation system, not a bus or a train that serves customers along the route, but 
a static entity such as a pipeline is that the infrastructure serves the interests of those at either end 
of the pipeline, and provides very little benefit for those in the middle. Specifically, a pipeline 
serves particular oil producers at one end and refineries or distributors at the other end 
(Makholm, 2012). More often than not, the approval or support for a given project will be based 
upon the weighing of the risks against the rewards, and justifying whether the benefits exceed the 
costs. From a political economic perspective it is valuable to assess the distribution of risks and 
the perceived equity of the relationships between those who benefit, and those who suffer 
regarding oil transportation decisions.  
 When examining the Energy East project in terms of the distribution of risks and equity it 
is vital to identify the various stakeholders and their relation to the project. As such, 
TransCanada has identified a preliminary list of potential stakeholders in reference to the Energy 
East Pipeline. This list includes 491 municipalities within the provinces of Alberta (38), 
Saskatchewan (92), Manitoba (57), Ontario (99), Quebec (174), and New Brunswick (31) 
(TransCanada, 2014b). In addition to the municipalities, 155 Aboriginal communities and 
organizations have been identified as being affected by the project (TransCanada, 2014b). The 
Aboriginal communities are distributed all along the pipeline route: Alberta (12), Saskatchewan 
(23), Manitoba (19), Ontario (63), Quebec (22), and New Brunswick (16), with communities 
being located within 0.0 to 320.3km from the Energy East mainline (TransCanada, 2014b). It is 
these municipalities and communities that are being placed at immediate risk in the event of a 
pipeline spill, rupture, or leak. Furthermore, there are countless other areas that will also be 
affected through upstream and downstream effects of the project that TransCanada has not 
included in its list of stakeholders. According to the National Energy Board, it is the requirement 
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of the regulated companies to communicate with, and involve the public and Aboriginal peoples, 
as well as the responsibility of landowners and other affected people or groups to make their 
concerns known to the company as early as possible and stay involved in the company’s 
consultation process (National Energy Board, 2014a). To the extent that individuals and groups 
are not included in the list of stakeholders or have not self-identified as affected by the project, 
the Board does not actively engage in its own stakeholder identification process. The fact that 
TransCanada, the project proponent, identifies who is considered and not considered 
stakeholders illustrates the imbalance of power and the pursuit of corporate interests.    
 In order to provide a citizen-centered view of the project, the Council of Canadians has 
developed a campaign opposing the Energy East Pipeline cleverly named “Our Risk. Their 
Reward.” Their list of the risks surrounding the project is more inclusive of a wide range of 
environmental and social issues, issues that the company would rather not acknowledge. The 
identified risks include the risk of pipeline spills, tar sands expansion, reliance on fracked gas 
imports, disrespecting indigenous rights, energy shortages, climate change pressures, and 
detracting from investments in green energy, while “their reward” refers to the profits that will 
be captured from the export pipeline for “Big Oil” (Council of Canadians, 2014a). Overall, the 
sentiment regarding Energy East is that Eastern Canada is fronting all of the environmental risks 
for the economic benefit of Alberta oil interests. Not surprisingly, with the Northern Gateway 
Pipeline project, the Government of British Columbia (B.C.) also expressed concerns regarding 
the unequal distribution of the risks (BC Newsroom, 2012) and has continued to reaffirm that 
British Columbia receives a fair share of the fiscal and economic benefits of the project that 
reflects the level, degree, and nature of the risk borne by the province before it will consider 
support for the pipeline (BC Newsroom, 2013). According to B.C.’s Minister of Environment, on 
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behalf of the Liberal B.C. government, the environmental risks to B.C. included one hundred 
percent of the marine environmental risk and fifty-eight percent of the land environmental risk 
for a mere seventeen percent of the economic benefits (compared to Alberta’s sixty-eight percent 
share) (BC Newsroom, 2012). The overall perception of the Energy East project, similarly to 
Northern Gateway, is that the risks and the benefits associated with the pipeline are unequally 
distributed and only serve a select number of interests. 
 There are obvious distributional differences in terms of the risk and benefits between the 
company and the communities along the pipeline route. In addition, there are also political and 
jurisdictional equity issues amongst the provinces. Obviously, there exists a distributional 
difference of risks and benefits between Alberta and the other provinces where the pipeline will 
traverse; however, within the provinces where Energy East travels these questions of equity are 
further established. The Energy East project includes the conversion of almost 3,000km of the 
Canadian Mainline from natural gas to oil service (TransCanada, 2014b). The conversion 
sections are located through the provinces of Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario 
(TransCanada, 2014b) while the new pipeline segments will be across Quebec and New 
Brunswick.  According to a study by the National Petroleum Council for the U.S. Department of 
Energy, "pipelines operating outside of their design parameters such as those carrying 
commodities for which they were not initially designed, or high flow pipelines, are at the greatest 
risk of integrity issues in the future due to the nature of their operation" (Oil Infrastructure 
Subgroup, 2011). Thus, the provinces along the route that are subject to the conversion stand at a 
higher risk of spill incidents than the provinces where the new pipeline segments will be built. 
Furthermore, the refineries and marine terminals that are part of the project and have the 
potential to generate economic benefits are all located in Quebec and New Brunswick. Therefore 
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it appears that if any provinces are to benefit from the project it will be Quebec and New 
Brunswick, while Ontario, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan all bear a disproportionate burden of the 
risks while seeing little benefit.                  
 The Duty to Consult  
 The duty to consult is a legal doctrine generally used in reference to Aboriginal rights, 
but for the purpose of this analysis, this paper will explore the duty to consult more generally in 
terms of public consultation and the opportunities to participate in decision-making processes. 
The duty to consult is a complex idea that encompasses aspects of other ideologies such as the 
distribution of risks and equity and ideas of responsible and representative government. The duty 
to consult also creates a mixture of relationships between various interests such as the public and 
government, the public and industry, industry and the government, as well as government and 
government. For the purpose of this section of the analysis the structure of consultation will 
focus on public participation, placing Aboriginal consultation to the side for a moment. When 
discussing ideas of consultation the most prominent issue is that there is a wide degree in 
variance as to what is intended to be consultation; furthermore, what is considered adequate, or 
meaningful, consultation. 
  The first relationship of consultation involves the public and government, generally in 
terms of a formal consultation processes. With the Energy East Pipeline project the National 
Energy Board will be the government body that will be responsible for the review process. 
Although TransCanada has submitted no official application, the NEB has already released its 
list of issues that it will consider regarding the project (National Energy Board, 2014b) as well as 
holding open houses to help anyone wanting to become part of the review (CBC News, 2014a). 
The NEB states that the list of issues “keeps everyone focused on the issues that are relevant to 
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the Board’s assessment” (National Energy Board, 2014c); however, according to the Council of 
Canadians, deciding the issues in advance of the actual application is an act of bad faith (Council 
of Canadians, 2014d). It is important to note that due to recent legislative changes the formal 
review process has severely limited public participation in the process, while simultaneously 
creating a regulatory environment suited to the interests of industry. The Jobs, Growth and Long-
Term Prosperity Act, commonly referred to as Bill C-38, is responsible for modifying public 
participation rules such that in order to participate, people will have to prove they will be directly 
affected or have relevant information or expertise, thereby excluding participants seeking to 
bring in “upstream” or “downstream” impacts of pipeline development (Scott, 2013a). Therefore, 
a citizen with a general concern related to a project is not able to participate in the formal 
decision-making process. Furthermore, the new legislation encompassed in the National Energy 
Board Act, s.52(4), benefits companies by expediting the decision-making process and placing 
time limits, such as fifteen months for the NEB to review pipeline projects, such that the review 
and public involvement do not slow down or in any way hinder industry progress and revenue 
streams.   
In addition to the formal review process that will occur after the application is submitted, 
the Government of Ontario has engaged in its own consultation process to determine the 
province’s standpoint on the project. Ontario’s Minister of Energy asked the Ontario Energy 
Board (OEB) to examine and report on the Energy East Pipeline from an Ontario perspective 
considering four areas of potential impact: the impacts on natural gas consumers, the impacts on 
pipeline safety and the environment, the impacts on Aboriginal communities, and the short and 
long-term economic impacts of the project in Ontario (Ontario Energy Board, 2014a). According 
to environmental groups the hope is that the Ontario government will be able to address citizen 
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concerns in a more meaningful way than the NEB, since the process is much more inclusive to 
the broad range of concerns the public has (Leahy, 2014) as well as having the potential to make 
a political statement by standing up for Ontarians interests (Harden-Donahue, 2014).   
 Industry and the public have their own set of relationships when it comes to consultation. 
In contrast to the mandatory consultation that has to occur between the public and the 
government, industry does not have a legally mandated duty to engage in consultation. However, 
due to mounting opposition from public citizen groups and Aboriginal communities, companies 
have begun to recognize the importance of early consultation processes in order to try to harness 
support for their projects. As such, TransCanada began its stakeholder engagement program in 
the second quarter of 2013, conducting sixty-one open houses along the proposed route 
(TransCanada, 2014b) although the company has yet to officially file its project application with 
the National Energy Board. In discussing the engagement program, the company reveals that the 
purpose of the consultation is to provide clear, relevant, and timely information about the project; 
identify concerns of community leaders; answer questions; and ensure NEB engagement 
requirements are met (TransCanada, 2014b). Based on the perceived purpose of consultation, it 
is clear that the company has conceived consultation as a one-sided sharing of information 
lacking any real collaboration or public influence.            
Responsible and Representative Government  
 Doern and Toner (1985) state “cabinet-parliamentary government demands both 
responsible and representative government simultaneously” (p.16). These two aspects, 
representative and responsible government, are two highly held ideologies that are expected of 
the various governments within Canada. Responsible government refers to the ability of 
government and the political executive to be responsible to the people, generally through the 
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confidence of the elected legislature (Dyck, 2006). Representative government, on the other 
hand, refers to a form of government including an assembly elected by the citizens (Dyck, 2006). 
The overall concepts of the two ideologies is that the government, regardless of what level: 
federal, provincial, or municipal, is in place to respond to the people that it represents. The 
intersection of these ideas of the role of government with oil transportation decision-making has 
shifted from a process that occurred predominately between industry and government to one in 
which the public has become apprehensive about the government fulfilling its duties to the 
citizens, and as such increasingly demands a larger input.      
 When examining oil transportation it becomes necessary to look at the broader 
development of natural resources. The decision to extract natural resources, from the tar sands, 
directly impacts the need for oil transportation infrastructure and the pace of development. The 
current federal approach is based on “Responsible Resource Development,” an initiative by the 
federal government under Canada’s Economic Action Plan. This initiative is meant to “maximize 
that value that Canada draws from [its] natural resources” through four key themes: making the 
review process for major projects more predictable and timely; reducing duplication in the 
review process; strengthening environmental protection; and enhancing consultations with 
Aboriginal peoples (Government of Canada, 2014). An important aspect of this initiative and 
larger strategy has been the Jobs, Growth and Long-Term Prosperity Act more commonly 
referred to as the omnibus budget bill, Bill C-38. Bill C-38 represents a degradation of 
environmental protection including changes made to the Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Act which now allows for multiple projects to be exempt from environmental review, the 
Fisheries Act removed habitat protection provisions, endangered species no longer garner the 
same level of protection with amendments to the Species at Risk Act, and the National Round 
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Table on the Environment and Economy has recently been disassembled (Boyd, 2012). The 
reason for the discussion of the omnibus Bill C-38 is to highlight the lack of democratic process 
in these policy changes that will impact larger decisions, including oil transportation. Since the 
changes were part of the budget bill, elected members of Parliament were unable to vote on 
specific matters, thus having to vote in favour of the entire bill or trigger a loss of confidence in 
the political executive, followed by an election. In addition, the omnibus bill deprived the 
parliamentary committee, made up of elected Members of Parliament, of its intended purpose of 
providing committee hearings and debates, for it was nearly impossible for the committee to 
properly examine and provide expertise on all of the elements of the bill within the given 
timeframe (Coyne, 2012). 
  Not only did Bill C-38 revoke much of the progress on environmental protection, but a 
main feature of “Responsible Resource Development” focuses on streamlining projects through 
regulatory processes without allowing for meaningful public discussion and debate to occur. 
Furthermore, opposition to new transportation infrastructure centers on spill risk, but also on the 
larger issue of the expansion of the tar sands. The number of protests to these new projects, the 
Line 9 rallies in Toronto (Bonnar, 2013) and the vote against the Northern Gateway Pipeline in a 
Kitimat plebiscite (Rowland, 2014), indicate the inadequacy of Canadian governments to act in 
accordance to the people it is supposed to represent. Canadians are asking government to pause 
and open the door to discussions on resource development, yet these discussions are being 
suppressed from formal venues and are left to occur in the streets. As suggested by Dayna Scott, 
‘“responsible’” resource development policy would include deliberation on a national plan to 
move the resources” and “would moderate the pace of development in the [tar] sands until the 
government puts a reasonable oil infrastructure strategy in place” (Scott, 2013b). 
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 The public dissatisfaction with the way the federal government, behind the leadership of 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper, is advancing the oil sector reveals a changing dynamic in how 
oil transportation is addressed. The public has increasingly become aware of how oil is 
transported, and as such is asking to become involved in these decisions. However, rather than 
allowing and promoting public involvement, the government has done the opposite by restricting 
who can participate in decision-making processes. Instead of any concerned citizen or 
organization becoming involved in environmental decision-making, participation has been 
restricted as a result of Bill C-38 and changes to the National Energy Board Act, s.55(2) people 
will have to prove they will be directly affected or have relevant information or expertise related 
to the project. As well, joint review panels have been eliminated; as a result, the environmental 
implications of major energy projects will be evaluated only by the energy regulator (Ecojustice, 
2012). As such, those interested in participating in the NEB process with regards to Energy East 
are already expressing frustrations with the procedure (CBC News, 2014a). These limitations on 
public participation serve to reflect upon the distancing of government from its role as 
representative and responsible to the people.    
 National Interests  
 Probably one of the most contested ideologies that exist in Canada’s current political 
economic landscape is that of the “national interest.” The core idea of the national interest is that 
the decision at hand, or the chosen path, is selected based upon the belief that it will benefit the 
nation as a whole. The reason for its contestation is that there are multiple ideas about what 
constitutes the national interests based on individual perceptions and collective interests. For 
instance, there are two polar opinions on the development and expansion of the Alberta tar sands. 
One opinion is that developing the tar sands is in the national interest, as it can provide a source 
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of economic benefits and growth. On the other hand, the opposing view is that putting a stop to 
tar sands development based on the urgency to reduce the negative climatic and environmental 
implications of its operations and its effects on climate change is in the national interest. It is thus 
the existence of these competing views of the national interest, and who is promoting their vision 
of national interest that come to shape and justifies certain decisions.  
 The national interest has played an important role in natural resource decision-making by 
governmental bodies. The Royal Commission on Energy, known as the Borden Commission, 
during the Diefenbaker government, which coincidently was responsible for deciding on the 
Alberta to Montreal Pipeline (the Commission rejected the pipeline), saw their responsibility not 
only as recommending policies that would serve the national interest, but as in fact defining the 
national interest (Doern & Toner, 1985). Furthermore, in reference to the Commission an 
observer noted that “the key question here is: whose interests were eventually to be taken by the 
commission to constitute the national interest?” (Doern & Toner, 1985, p.76). Arguably, little 
has changed in terms of how the national interest is defined from the decision in the late fifties to 
reject the Alberta to Montreal Pipeline during the Diefenbaker era to the future decision 
regarding the new proposal of an Alberta to New Brunswick pipeline, Energy East.       
 When discussing national interests and oil infrastructure in Canada one cannot complete 
an analysis without looking into the role the National Energy Board (NEB) plays as a regulatory 
body. The NEB was established in 1959 and has been concerned with public interest regulation 
of interprovincial pipelines and also the level of exports and imports of oil in gas in the national 
interest (Doern & Gattinger, 2003). According to the amended National Energy Board Act, s. 
12(1), the Board has jurisdiction “where it appears to the Board that the circumstances may 
require the Board, in the public interest, to make any order or give any direction, leave, sanction 
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or approval that by law it is authorized to make or give.” However, critics argue that the “public 
interest” clause should be called into challenge in light of the recent approval of the Line 9 
Pipeline amidst public protests calling the approval invalid because the NEB failed in its 
mandate to protect the public interest (Flegg, 2014).        
 In terms of Energy East, TransCanada has employed various strategies in attempts to 
frame the project as being in Canada’s national interest and garner more support for the pipeline. 
One tactic the company has used is the comparison of the Energy East Pipeline with historical 
nation-building ventures such as the Canadian Pacific Railway or the Trans-Canada Highway, in 
efforts to entice Canadians’ sense of patriotism in order to garner support for the project (Krugel, 
2013a). At a news conference, TransCanada CEO Russ Girling, when speaking about the 
pipeline, furthered the national interest rhetoric by stating that he has a “strong belief that 
building critical infrastructure ties our country together, making us stronger and more in control 
of our own destiny" (Krugel, 2013a). New Brunswick Premier David Alward is also in support 
of the pipeline for national reasons stating, “this pipeline will be as important to our nation’s 
economic future as the railway was to our past” (Alward, 2013). The project from this standpoint 
will create economic opportunities, including jobs and market diversification for increased 
exports while also increasing energy security. Much energy has been devoted to building up a 
case around the “national interest” of the Energy East pipeline. Not surprisingly, those whose 
idea of national interest is supported by the pipeline are those related to industry and 
government.      
 However, just as there are those who are in support of Energy East there coexists another 
perception of the national interest that opposes the project. The opposition stems from the view 
that constricting, rather than expanding the tar sands is in the national interest. Energy East 
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would represent a one-third increase in the capacity of the pipeline systems (Demerse & 
Flanagan, 2014) and with expected tar sands development set to increase Energy East would 
serve as an important piece of transportation infrastructure. Energy East also has a direct 
relationship with the tar sands in terms of its upstream emissions. A report released by the 
Pembina Institute calculates that the Energy East Pipeline upstream greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions will total between thirty and thirty-two million tonnes of annual emissions (Demerse 
& Flanagan, 2014). Furthermore, the economic benefits that are said to stem from refining 
western crude in Eastern Canada have been called into question. Canadian refineries along the 
pipeline route, as mentioned previously, do not have enough refining capacity to meet the needs 
of the pipeline, leading to the conclusion that a majority of the oil transported through the 
pipeline will bypass Canadian companies and be available for marine export (Council of 
Canadians et al., 2014). Therefore, depending on how the national interest is perceived, the 
argument for or against the Energy East Pipeline will differ. Identifying which actors’ conception 
of the national interest is promoted reveals a lot about the political economy of Canada 
concerning oil transportation and the future of the tar sands.        
Sustainable Development  
 Sustainable development is an ideology that has been made popular by the United 
Nations Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) titled Our 
Common Future, more commonly referred to as the Brundtland Commission or Brundtland 
Report. The main concept of sustainable development “is development that meets the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” 
(WCED, 1987).  The notion of sustainable development is conceptualized as a driving ideology 
of development paths, in so much as nations should be basing decisions on sustainability criteria 
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and choosing activities that are in line with the idea of sustainable development. Similarly to the 
ideology of national interest, there are many and wide ranging interpretations of what sustainable 
development looks like in practice and how to achieve sustainable development. From a political 
economic standpoint, evaluating oil transportation from a sustainable development lens requires 
an examination into who benefits and who is left disadvantaged by abiding by, or disregarding, 
sustainable practices.  
There is much to be analyzed in terms of sustainable development of oil transportation 
systems, and the larger context of tar sands development in Canada. Robert Gibson has 
developed a sustainability assessment evaluative tool that employs eight core generic criteria that 
can be applied to decisions or policy. The criteria include: socio-ecological system integrity; 
livelihood sufficiency and opportunity; intragenerational equity; intergenerational equity; 
resource maintenance and efficiency; socio-ecological civility and democratic governance; 
precaution and adaptation; and immediate and long-term integration (Gibson, 2006). While the 
current analysis cannot go into detail analyzing each criterion regarding oil transportation in 
Canada, the criteria are helpful in framing the overall ideology of sustainable development and 
exploring the competing interests and power relations inherent in the criteria. For the purpose of 
the current analysis, two aspects of oil transportation and the tar sands will be explored in terms 
of sustainability, expansion of the tar sands and air quality standards.  
As mentioned previously, any discussion of oil transportation must take into account 
where the oil is coming from and why the transportation infrastructure is required. In Canada, the 
scheduled expansion of tar sands development and exploitation (6.7 million barrels per day by 
2030) rests on the assumption that transportation capacity can grow in order to accommodate the 
increase in supply (CAPP, 2013). Alternatively, new transportation infrastructure, once in place, 
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requires expansion in the tar sands to justify the sunk costs (Scott, 2014a). From a sustainable 
development perspective, the Brundtland Report in discussing fossil fuels states, “the rate of 
depletion should take into account the criticality of that resource, the availability of technologies 
[for] minimizing depletion, and the likelihood of substitutes being available” (WCED, 1987). 
Furthermore, after assessing the world’s remaining recoverable reserves, the report concludes 
with, “the world should immediately embark on a vigorous oil conservation policy” (WCED, 
1987). Indeed, the trend in terms of the Alberta tar sands has been the opposite of conservation. 
Since the release of the Brundtland Report development in the tar sands region has continued to 
grow, in 2012 production increased to over 3.2 million barrels per day, with production 
forecasted to reach 6.7 million bpd by 2030 (CAPP, 2013).  
One of the main implications of continued and accelerated tar sands expansion are the 
dire climatic consequences, especially air quality standards. Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
from the tar sands are especially troublesome with emissions having tripled from seventeen 
megatonnes (Mt) in 1990 to fifty-five Mt in 2011, with absolute emissions from the tar sands 
projected to be 127 Mt by 2030, a 250 percent increase from present levels (Environmental 
Defence, 2014). Oil transportation infrastructure contributes to the associated air pollution by 
providing an outlet for the product and encouraging further development. Furthermore, a report 
by the Pembina Institute calculated the upstream emissions of the Energy East Pipeline and 
concluded that the pipeline will carry an upstream GHG impact of between thirty and thirty-two 
million tonnes of annual emissions, the equivalent of adding seven million cars to the road 
(Demerse & Flanagan, 2014). 
Based on the ideology of sustainable development, the total emissions from tar sands 
operations and the expansion of the tar sands should be limited to within standards that work 
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towards achieving sustainability. With respect to emissions, the federal government announced 
in 2011 that it would begin working on GHG emission regulations for the oil and gas sector with 
regulations finished by the end of 2012; however, as of yet no regulations have been established 
(Paris, 2013a). Alberta has been working to develop provincial regulations surrounding GHG 
emissions from the industry with a proposed 40/40 target, a plan that would demand industry to 
reduce greenhouse gases by forty percent per barrel and charge $40 per tonne of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) above that level (Paris, 2013b).  
However, while GHG emission regulations are warranted under sustainable development 
ideas, there are very strong interests stemming from industry that oppose regulation. Internal 
documents retrieved from an Alberta Freedom of Information request show that industry is 
resisting even the weakest of the proposed regulations (Environmental Defence, 2014) and is 
encouraging a further delay of putting the regulations into effect (Paris, 2013b).  Industry is 
promoting a twenty percent intensity reduction of emissions and $20 per tonne of CO2, half of 
the proposed regulations of the provincial government (Paris, 2014b). The delays from the 
federal government in establishing any regulatory framework at all also hints at maintaining the 
status quo in which industry is favoured over citizens and does not consider the implications on 
future generations. Therefore, it can be concluded that an ideology of sustainable development is 
one that is not promoted by those actors who benefit from the oil industry, whether it be direct 
tar sands investment, or transportation of the resource.      
Market Liberalism  
 The term liberalism, when used in a political sense, is an ideology based on the belief of 
maximizing individual freedom, liberty, and self-fulfillment (Dyck, 2006). When discussing 
market liberalism, sometimes also referred to as economic liberalism, the main notion is that the 
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market is the dominant driver. The role of government in a liberal market is to be minimal and 
let markets dictate actions. The idea is that the state inhibits individualism and the role of the 
state should be minimized to allow capitalist market forces to determine the distribution of power 
and wealth (Dyck, 2006). These market forces generally refer to simple supply and demand 
curves. The degree to which the state employs the ideology of market liberalism has implications 
on the structure of power and how interests are pursued. Within a market-based policy model, 
private capital rather than Canadian governments are seen to be the most influential in 
determining the nature, location, scale, and pace of energy resources development (Winfield, 
2012b). Increasingly in Canada, market processes direct the oil sector with oil transportation 
infrastructure also serving these larger market forces. As such, two influential market forces are 
at play regarding the Energy East project, changing market dynamics in terms of demand and 
supply, and secondly crude oil pricing.     
 In terms of market dynamics, as mentioned previously, the relationship with the United 
States regarding oil imports is changing. The U.S. demand for Canadian crude products has 
stagnated (Hoberg, 2013) and yet the existing oil transportation infrastructure heavily relies upon 
serving this declining market. Not only is there pressure from industry to diversify the market, 
but the market itself is changing. The potential growth of crude production from the tar sands 
exceeds the demand growth of the entire North American market, while demand in the Asia-
Pacific countries has become the fastest growing worldwide (CAPP, 2013). According to market 
principles, you sell product to where the demand is; in this case China, India, Japan, and Korea 
become desirable targets. Thus the desire of industry is to create transportation links between 
Canada and Asia. The Energy East project serves to make this link possible by connecting the 
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Alberta tar sands with the Atlantic coast via New Brunswick where oil tankers can transport the 
crude across the ocean to meet the growing Asian demand.  
The second market principle at play with the Energy East Pipeline is associated with the 
pricing of Canadian bitumen compared to other sources of crude. Due to the competition of both 
Canadian sources of oil and U.S. crude sources being sold in the U.S. midcontinent region 
Canadian oil is being sold at a discounted price (Angevine, 2013). Due to the price discounting, 
calculations suggests that producers are losing out on $50 million a day in profits on the 
Canadian oil that exported (Leach, 2013). The loss in profit due to selling Canadian crude into a 
saturated market explains the pressure by industry to secure access to tidewaters. The rationale 
for reaching tidewaters is that in addition to serving markets with higher demands for product, 
Canadian crude would be able to fetch a higher price, closer to world prices. Although it is 
important to remember that heavier crude, such as Alberta bitumen, generally fetches lower 
prices than lighter crude due to the additional processing that is required during refinement 
(Angevine, 2013). As with accessing Asian markets to meet demand, in order to receive a higher 
price on Canadian oil, transportation infrastructure needs to be available to service these markets.          
 The push for oil pipelines to access tidewaters, such at the Northern Gateway Pipeline 
and the Energy East Pipeline, illustrate the adherence to a liberal market ideology. One such 
strategy that was attempted in Canada that was not market driven and impacted the oil industry 
was the Trudeau government’s 1980 National Energy Program (NEP). The NEP was intended to 
change the structure of power between the federal and provincial governments, as well as the 
power between the federal government and the oil industry (Doern & Toner, 1985). The goals of 
the NEP were for Canada to seize control of their own energy future through energy security, to 
offer Canadians the opportunity to participate in the energy industry, and to share in the benefits 
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of industry expansion recognizing the requirement of fairness (Doern & Toner, 1985). It is clear 
that these three objectives were not market-based in principle and illustrate the ideological shift 
since the 1980’s to market liberalism in the oil industry. Furthermore, if the Energy East project 
were designed with Trudeau’s ideological view on the power relations between the government 
and industry it can be expected that the pipeline would serve to promote Canadian energy 
security, public participation opportunities would be expanded, and the benefits would be shared 
equitably across Canada rather than benefiting the interest of those who focus on market 
principles and are directly associated with the profits of oil exports.     
C. Institutional Factors  
Cabinet-parliamentary Government  
 Various institutional factors, cabinet-parliamentary government, federalism, and 
Aboriginal rights, provide the structural basis of power for the key interests involved with oil 
transportation in Canada. The reason the various interests involved with oil transportation have 
the capacity to exercise power is the existence of these institutional factors (Doern & Toner, 
1985). In terms of cabinet-parliamentary government the basis of power resides predominately in 
the executive branch of government. The executive is comprised of the Governor General, the 
Prime Minister, and Cabinet that are advised by the bureaucracy (Dyck, 2006). The reasoning 
behind concentrated power in the executive is that it facilitates government action, as opposed to 
the presidential-congressional system of the United States that can tend to inhibit government 
action (Dyck, 2006). In a cabinet-parliamentary system, the executive branch of government is 
provided with a large degree of autonomy, ensuring that the interests of the executive become 
law (Hessing & Howlett, 1997). While a concentration of power in the executive does promote 
government action, the exercise of power also needs to be kept in check. Too much power in the 
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executive level of government takes away from the role of Parliament and the elected 
representation that is meant to respond to the citizens of Canada in a democratic way.   
 Canada’s current Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, enjoys a majority government that was 
elected into power in 2011. Under a majority government, Parliament may criticize or propose 
amendments to legislation; however, a majority of the Members of Parliament (MPs) belong to 
the same party as the Prime Minister and rigid party discipline can ensure that the actions of the 
Prime Minister are supported (Dyck, 2006). Therefore, the opposition parties may initiate 
conversations and debates surrounding issues, yet with a lack of voting power in Parliament 
there is little room for opposition to force meaningful changes to proposed legislation. Relative 
to Members of Parliament (even those belonging to the governing party), increasingly the power 
of the Cabinet, especially in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) is being concentrated (Howlett 
& Brownsey, 2008; Ibbitson, 2013). The increased concentration of power allows the Cabinet 
and Prime Minister to enact legislation that directly favours their interests with little or no 
opposition. The use of this power has been wielded and its impacts are quite evident when 
examining new legislation geared towards oil transportation and natural resource development in 
general (De Souza, 2012). In the case of oil transportation, there has been a trend in the current 
federal government’s approach towards weakening environmental regulations in order to have 
new transportation infrastructure projects approved (Suzuki, 2014a). This is done in the name of 
“streamlining” the regulatory process and demonstrates a clear intention of the wishes of the 
Harper government to accommodate energy development (Harris, 2014).  
 One of the most illustrative examples of the changes to legislation to promote oil 
transportation infrastructure has been the Jobs, Growth and Long-Term Prosperity Act, 
(S.C. 2012, c. 19), otherwise titled the omnibus Bill C-38. While reference has been made to Bill 
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C-38 in previous sections, it is important to highlight the implications of the legislation, 
especially in terms of executive power, and its effects on shaping the oil transportation systems 
in Canada. The Jobs, Growth and Long-Term Prosperity Act, while actually a budget bill, served 
to place more power into the hands of the executive regarding energy and resource matters by 
including a host of non-budget related amendments. The first major change under Bill C-38 was 
the politicization of the amended Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, s.14(2); the changes 
make it such that instead of projects automatically requiring an environmental assessment, the 
Minister of the Environment is responsible for designating a project for assessment. Since the 
Minister chooses whether or not a project requires an environmental assessment the process has 
become a political decision that will no doubt be subject to heavy industrial lobbying and 
influence (David Suzuki Foundation, 2012). It is speculated that only a handful of projects will 
be designated for an environmental assessment, a major benefit to industry that will have one 
less regulatory hurdle to maneuver and less environmental constraints to appease.  
Furthermore, as stipulated in the amended Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, s.42 
(9) and s.50, in the event that an environmental assessment is to be conducted, strict time limits 
will be enforced and the Minister of the Environment now has the power to terminate the process 
and reassign an assessment from an independent panel to an in-house assessment conducted by 
the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency if he or she suspects the assessment will not be 
completed on time. Moving projects in-house for assessment will only add to the ability of 
politics to intrude in what is to be a non-partisan process. In addition to the imposed time limits 
and politicized designation process, if an environmental assessment is completed for a given 
project the Cabinet has the last say and can overrule decisions according to the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act, s.52. The ability to overrule decisions reduces the credibility of 
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the process and makes the procedure meaningless, reducing a once positive step in mediating 
environmental and economic goals to a mere smoke screen. Along these lines, Cabinet has also 
been granted power over pipeline decisions being able to decide to reject or approve a pipeline 
application; furthermore, Cabinet has also been granted authority to reverse decisions made by 
the NEB under revisions made to the National Energy Board Act, s.52(4). The new revisions 
have ultimately placed the future of oil transportation into the hands of Cabinet, a collection of 
politicians hand-picked by the Prime Minister himself. Moreover, these legislative changes 
hidden as part of Bill C-38 do not even begin to address the countless environmental 
amendments that make energy projects such as new oil transportation infrastructure possible, but 
rather reflect the intensification of power in the Cabinet and a distancing from the parliamentary 
aspect of government, resulting in oil transportation decision being made in the absence of 
political debate.  
While the cabinet-parliamentary government structure of Canada does enable 
government action, the concentration and intensification of power in the executive is damaging 
to democracy and leads to a monopolization of decision-making power. Michael Ignatieff, the 
former federal Liberal party leader, has remarked “the [P]rime [M]inister’s capacity to dictate 
House business, put together omnibus bills and ram them through, while imposing party 
discipline, has concentrated executive power at the expense of the legislature” (Ibbitson, 2013). 
The implication for oil transportation projects, such as Energy East, is that under the new 
National Energy Board Act the veto point that previously could be employed by the NEB in 
terms of the regulatory body rejecting a project has been completely eliminated, such that the 
Harper government has concentrated the approval process of pipelines under its direct control 
and made the NEB’s decision a mere recommendation (Hoberg, 2013). With Prime Minister 
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Harper and previous Minister of Natural Resources Joe Oliver actively promoting the project 
(Hoberg, 2013) it will come as no surprise if the Cabinet utilizes their executive power to ensure 
that the Energy East Pipeline is approved. Therefore, the power and interests at the executive 
level of the federal government have already played an influential role in clearing the path for 
new oil pipeline projects and its continued support for such projects will only ensure that the tar 
sands sector is able to expand as scheduled.       
Federalism  
 Federalism is a system of government characterized by two levels of authority and a 
division of power between the two levels, such that neither level is subordinate to the other 
(Dyck, 2006). In Canada these two levels of authority are divided between the federal 
government and the provincial governments with the division of responsibilities dictated by the 
Constitution Act, 1867. However, “the environment” was never explicitly mentioned in the 
division of responsibilities in sections 91 and 92; therefore, no level of government has direct 
power over the environment. This in turn creates a patchwork response for the environment, 
where the provinces cover different aspects of the environment while others fall into federal 
hands (Hessing, Howlett, & Summerville, 2005). The patchwork approach of environmental 
responsibilities also branches into energy matters where there is a constitutional division of 
powers between the provinces and the federal government, yet at the same time there are 
controversial areas of overlapping and unclear jurisdiction (Doern & Toner, 1985). In terms of 
oil transportation, the relevant responsibilities of provincial jurisdiction include resource 
exploration, development, and management within provincial borders; regulation and legislative 
framework as it pertains to energy supply; intraprovincial movement of energy and goods; 
property and civil rights; and environmental issues associated with land use planning (Dawson & 
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Bartucci, 2012). The relevant federal jurisdiction for energy and environmental matters include 
trans-boundary environmental impacts; interprovincial and international movement of energy 
and energy goods; and policies in the national interest (including economic development and 
energy security) (Dawson & Bartucci, 2012). The divided jurisdictional responsibilities creates a 
unique institutional experience when oil transportation infrastructure transcends provincial 
boundaries thereby making the project a matter of federal concern, yet having immense impact 
on the associated provinces. In terms of federalism and oil transportation, an examination of the 
varying interests of the provinces and federal government, as well as how their interests are 
pursued is required. In addition, examining the power struggles between the provinces provides 
valuable insight into competing interests across Canada and how these diverse interests are 
reconciled.  
  Doern and Gattinger (2003) note “divided jurisdiction means that energy policy-making 
is always a process of federal-provincial bargaining” (p.24). The issue becomes even more 
complicated when transportation of energy is added into the equation. Due to the aforementioned 
spatial and geographic realities, when oil is the energy source, transportation more often than not 
involves traversing provincial or national borders. Once transportation crosses any boundary the 
jurisdictional responsibility becomes that of the federal government due to the division of roles 
set out in the constitution. With the Energy East project traversing multiple provincial borders 
from Alberta across Canada to New Brunswick there is no question that the federal government 
has the jurisdictional authority over the project and will exercise such authority through the 
National Energy Board. Furthermore, the project entails a level of trade, shipping crude from the 
two new marine terminals to international markets, again a responsibility of the federal 
                                                                                  Political Economy of Oil Transportation                        51
government. Yet while the federal government has a large degree of authority over the pipeline 
project there are several provincial factors at play that influence the project.       
  While the project falls under federal jurisdiction, provinces still retain authority over 
provincial lands and resources meaning that while the project itself will be decided at the federal 
level, a significant number of provincial approvals will also be required if the project is to go 
ahead (Hoberg, 2013). This has been made clear in the way that Premier Clark of British 
Columbia has added five separate provincial conditions that Enbridge must meet before the 
provincial government will approve the Northern Gateway Pipeline (Hunter, 2014). TransCanada 
itself has highlighted some of the various authorizations under provincial legislation that may be 
necessary for the construction and operation of the project (TransCanada, 2014b). Each province 
has its own legislation pertaining to issues such as wildlife, water, heritage sites, forests, 
highways, and provincial resources. For example, the relevant Ontario legislation that may be 
affected by Energy East includes the Conservation Authority Act, Ontario Water Resources Act, 
Ontario Endangered Species Act, Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act, Public Lands Act, Ontario 
Heritage Act, Highway Traffic Act, and Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act 
(TransCanada, 2014b).  Although provincial approvals are warranted under certain provincial 
legislation, it is unclear or not whether a “defiant province could thwart a federally approved 
pipeline” (Hoberg, 2013). Hence one of the incongruences with federalism is that each level of 
government is designed such that one is not subordinate to the other, yet in the face of a conflict 
of interest between the two levels one will predominate. Due to the federal power of authority 
over policies in the national interest, as discussed previously, the expansive level of 
interpretation as to what constitutes the national interest means that this power can be 
manipulated to defend a decision that may face provincial dissent. Nonetheless, one strategy for 
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provinces to combat federal power is to present a clear statement of opposition to the project 
which would carry significant political weight and have the effect of creating a “potential” veto 
point (Hoberg, 2013).   
 A recent example of how the various aspects of federalism interact with oil transportation 
projects and the jurisdiction of the federal and provincial governments has been evidenced in 
Quebec. The jurisdictional area of contestation is Cacouna, Quebec, and the site of one of the 
proposed marine terminals for the Energy East project. To begin with, TransCanada received 
permits from the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans to conduct seismic activity in April 
and drilling later in the spring to assess the nature of the seabed for the purposes of future 
construction (McCarthy, 2014a). Although the company has been granted federal approval 
marine scientists have raised concerns that the Energy East Pipeline project will threaten falling 
beluga whale populations in the St. Lawrence River due to seismic activity and other planned 
work occurring in areas and during times when belugas are suspected to calve (McCarthy, 
2014a). While the federal government had granted approval it was unclear if the company had 
received provincial consent for these activities. As a result, four environmental groups along 
with a Cacouna citizen filed an injunction request in the Quebec Superior Court asking for a ten 
day halt in drilling activities while the groups tried to ascertain whether TransCanada had 
obtained federal and provincial permits for the exploratory drilling (Scott, 2014). It was revealed 
in court that the company had not received a provincial permit, and had only applied for one 
regarding drilling after the injunction was submitted (Scott, 2014). The result of the injunction 
has been an out-of-court settlement in which TransCanada has agreed to hold off on exploratory 
drilling until the time that it receives a provincial permit (Scott, 2014). The success of the 
injunction illustrates one aspect of how provincial legislation may interfere with industry 
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interests even in the face of federal approval, demonstrating the complexities of federalism in 
relation to energy projects.       
Aboriginal Rights  
 The final institutional factor that influences the power dynamics of oil transportation in 
Canada, especially in reference to the shipment of Alberta tar sands crude is the Aboriginal 
peoples of Canada and their rights. There are two core institutional rights that protect the land, 
and activities on the land with regards to Aboriginal use. The first right is treaty rights which are 
Aboriginal rights based on treaties signed with the Crown (Dyck, 2006). The second set of rights, 
Aboriginal title, is not as straightforward as treaty rights yet have been upheld by the Canadian 
courts and refers to a claim to land on the basis of traditional occupancy and use rather than a 
treaty (Dyck, 2006). As with the environment and energy, the jurisdiction regarding Aboriginal 
peoples is also split between the federal and provincial governments. The federal government is 
responsible for Aboriginal peoples and reserves, yet the provinces have authority over public 
lands to the extent that land claims and settlements are often complicated and unsettled due to the 
divided jurisdictional responsibility (Dyck, 2006). 
 When it comes to oil transportation, the rights of Aboriginal peoples play a very 
important role, especially when the infrastructure crosses traditional lands and territories. In 
addition to the federal government having responsibility over Aboriginal peoples, the Crown also 
has an obligation to consult and accommodate First Nations when projects, such as oil 
transportation infrastructure, could affect Aboriginal rights and title (Hoberg, 2013). As stated 
previously, since many title claims have yet to be resolved there is the potential for a great deal 
of conflict when projects traverse lands where title claims are being disputed. Furthermore, there 
are structural barriers to achieving meaningful consultation with Aboriginal groups due to a lack 
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of capacity to participate, unsettled land claims, and a lack of a clear protocol on the consultation 
process (Dawson & Bartucci, 2012).  
Institutionally, Aboriginal rights can provide very effective obstacles for companies 
trying to build and operate new oil transportation infrastructure through legal challenges. The 
Canadian court system has the power to veto a project if it is found that the government did not 
fulfill its duty to consult and if Aboriginal groups were not effectively accommodated (Hoberg, 
2013). Again, there is a wide latitude of interpretation as to what “effectively accommodated” 
may mean; however, regardless of the court ruling, a legal challenge can severely hinder and 
stall a project from approval as can direct action, blockages, injunctions, and so forth. In addition 
to the duty to consult, in a very recent Supreme Court of Canada decision on Aboriginal title, 
Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44, the court recognized the land rights of the 
Tsilhqot’in Nation (Bradley & Luk, 2014). The decision did not create a new right but 
recognized the Tsilhqot’in Nation’s existing title meaning that “they have ownership rights 
similar to any other landowner, such as occupying the land, deciding how the land is used, 
enjoying the economic benefits of the land, and managing and otherwise using the land” 
(Bradley & Luk, 2014). In terms of the consequences for resource development projects on lands 
subject to Aboriginal title, the Crown either requires the consent of the Aboriginal title-holder or 
must demonstrate “justified infringement” of Aboriginal title (Bradley & Luk, 2014). The result 
of this court decision in recognizing land rights has the potential to create many hurdles for 
government and industry wishing to engage in projects on Aboriginal land. Therefore, the power 
of Aboriginal rights and their interaction with other interests cannot be overlooked and provides 
a very unique factor in oil transportation across Canada.  
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 As mentioned previously, TransCanada has identified 155 Aboriginal communities and 
organizations that may be affected by the Energy East Pipeline (TransCanada, 2014b). 
TranCanada’s Aboriginal engagement program involves identifying Aboriginal communities that 
might have interest or concern about the project, providing information, working with 
communities to obtain local and traditional knowledge, obtaining socio-economic information 
regarding the project, facilitating economic participation, and determining appropriate mitigation 
strategies (TransCanada, 2014b). TransCanada has controversially hired Phil Fontaine, former 
chief of the Assembly of First Nations, as a company representative in meetings with the various 
First Nations groups to inform them of the Energy East project and seek their support 
(McCarthy, 2014b). However, despite TransCanada’s attempt to garner First Nations support for 
the pipeline opposition is quickly mounting. In the absence of an official application to the NEB 
groups are already devising strategies to oppose the project. Recently, a meeting of around 
seventy First Nations leaders met in Winnipeg to plan a strategy aimed at blocking the Energy 
East Pipeline (McCarthy, 2014b). A quote by Clayton Thomas-Muller, a Manitoba Cree, 
captures the essence of the opposition, “in this era of the Harper Conservative government, there 
is dramatic pressure that has been placed on the shoulders of First Nations peoples, with our 
constitutionally protected rights, to defend Canada’s air, water and earth from the agenda of Big 
Oil” (McCarthy, 2014b).  
The power behind Aboriginal rights and interests is integral in discussions of new oil 
transportation infrastructure in so much as the anticipated approval of the Northern Gateway 
Pipeline was met by a vow by First Nations leaders to challenge any approval in court and 
having warned of direct action if legal routes were to fail (McCarthy, 2014b). Court challenges 
are likely to delay the construction of the pipeline for a year or more (Hoberg, 2013) creating 
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major frustrations for the pipeline company and oil companies hoping to transport their product. 
The strong opposition that has been shown in British Columbia against the Northern Gateway 
Pipeline has largely been a function of the proposed route being through unceded territory 
(Hoberg, 2013) in contrast to the Energy East Pipeline that will pass through land that is 
predominately settled. Furthermore, the amount of influence that First Nations can exert over the 
project will depend on their ability to present a large and united front against the pipeline. As 
Energy East crosses six provinces there is a large degree of coordination that will be required, 
and a wide variety of interests that will need to be addressed and mediated. However, First 
Nations still have other legal remedies available in their arsenal, most notably the duty to consult 
which if not sufficient can lead to a court challenge against the federal government. Altogether, 
Aboriginal rights are an institutional element that require mediation by the different levels of 
government, as well as the company proponent or else can serve as a meaningful obstruction for 
the project both in terms of time delays and legal challenges.      
D. Interests/Societal Factors  
Public Opinion  
 Societal factors were not a part of Doern and Toner’s political economic analysis of the 
National Energy Program, and thus their framework has been criticized for failing to differentiate 
between the interests of state and non-state actors (Winfield, 2012a). Societal factors, although 
not a direct aspect of the decision-making power of oil transportation, can play a large role in 
influencing the actions of the actors who do make the decisions. As a non-state actor, the public 
oftentimes has very different interests than state actors and even other non-state actors. When 
discussing “the public” it is valuable to differentiate between the public and other actors within 
society. First, there are state actors that operate within a circumscribed set of constitutional and 
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institutional rules, secondly are market-based productive actors run by private capital, the third 
facet that composes a society is the public, otherwise known as the citizens for which the state 
actors are responsible to (Hessing & Howlett, 1997). Furthermore, it is important to note that 
mobilization of the entire public is impossible, yet there will always be a proportion of the public 
that becomes involved to represent certain interests (Hessing & Howlett, 1997).  
The benefit of public opinion is that it ensures a balance of divergent views on different 
political matters and enhances the inclusion of alternative approaches to an issue (Hessing & 
Howlett, 1997). As Winfield (2012a) points out, changing levels of societal concern for the 
environment and shifting conceptions of the appropriate role of government in this regard can be 
important drivers of environmental policy. Furthermore, government activity on a given issue 
has been shown to coincide with high levels of public concern or interest, known as the “issue-
attention cycle” (Winfield, 2012a). It is this sort of raised concern by the public regarding oil 
transportation that has placed the issue high on the political agenda across Canada. The public 
therefore plays a role in framing the debate, but more so ensures that the debate occurs (Hessing 
& Howlett, 1997). Overall, public opinion surrounding discussions on oil transportation in 
Canada can place pressure on governments, one way or another, and influence the existing power 
relationships. 
   One important characteristic of public opinion is that it is not uniform spatially or 
temporally. Similar to the varying conceptions of the national interest, public opinion differs 
based on one’s own or collective ideologies and interests. In terms of oil transportation in 
general, a series of public opinion polls conducted by Environment Canada, Natural Resources 
Canada, the petroleum industry, and by the CROP polling company compiled in an internal 
document called Public Opinion on Oil produced by Environment Canada reveal that, on one 
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hand, Canadians think that pipelines can transport oil safely, while on the other hand people are 
increasingly wary of the environmental risks of shipping or exporting oil using any kind of 
infrastructure (McDiarmid, 2014). Furthermore, fifty-one percent of Canadians think developing 
the tar sands is worth the environmental risk, while forty-nine percent do not, according to an 
online survey of 2,070 people for the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (McDiarmid, 
2014). The public opinion polls reflect a Canada that is clearly, yet evenly divided on the 
development of the tar sands and highlights a need for a larger conversation on the future energy 
path of Canada. Numbers aside, there is a growing wariness about the ability of the federal 
government to protect the environment under the Harper government’s avid push for responsible 
resource development, such that public opinion is resulting in public opposition to new oil 
transporting pipelines regardless of the route. One of the reasons provided for the mounting 
opposition of pipelines, are not the pipes itself but the increased pressure for climate regulation, 
with the issue being what is flowing through the pipes (Davison, 2014).  
 The dramatic increase in public interest around how and what type of crude is being 
transported across Canada has political and economic impacts. The mounting public pressure 
was evidenced on the tenth of May of this year when nearly 100 communities across Canada 
engaged in anti-pipeline protests under the banner “Defend Our Climate, Defend Our 
Communities” as part of a national day of action on climate change (CBC News, 2014b). This 
one collective day of action illustrates the national attention and public interest in oil 
transportation debates, which are seen as the catalyst for future tar sands expansion and the 
resulting climatic consequences. Thomas Mulcair, leader of Canada’s NDP party commented on 
public opinion and transporting oil saying that “Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s efforts to 
construct energy infrastructure are failing because the ruling Conservatives [have not] built 
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public support” adding that “if you [do not] have a social license at the same time you are getting 
the regulatory license, nothing gets built” (Argitis, 2014). The lack of public support for new 
infrastructure projects continues to stymie industry that is looking to diversify its crude markets 
as well as creating political battles between, and within, different governments.    
 Efforts to sway public opinion regarding the transportation of oil as well as the economic 
benefits of the tar sands have been employed by the federal government, the oil industry, and 
TransCanada itself. The oil industry has developed television, print, and online advertisement 
promoting the national economic and social benefits of the tar sands, as well as attempting to 
battle opposition based on the risk of spills, greenhouse gas emissions, and environmental 
degradation (Cryderman, 2013a). The advertisements are generally geared to try to sway “the 
mushy middle” of Canadian public opinion (Cryderman, 2013a); those who have yet to form a 
concrete opinion on the topic one way or another. Along with the oil industry, the Canadian 
Energy Pipeline Association (CEPA) spends $2.5 million annually on an array of advertising 
boasting the importance of pipelines (Cryderman, 2013a). The federal government has also taken 
to advertising strategies in attempts to gain support for the tar sands and its “Responsible 
Resource Development” campaign. Last year, the federal government spent approximately $16.5 
million on advertisements geared towards promoting its resource agenda (Cryderman, 2013a) 
while also increasing its advertising spending on the tar sands from $9 million to $16.5 million 
(Goldenberg, 2013). Furthermore, TransCanada has evoked its own approach to garner support 
for the Energy East Pipeline. The company has employed nation-building rhetoric in order to 
garner Canadian support, likening Energy East to "bold ventures" like the Canadian Pacific 
Railway and the Trans-Canada Highway (Krugel, 2013a). Historians suggest that the nation-
building sentiments are a way to sidestep the environmental backlash and try to invoke support 
                                                                                  Political Economy of Oil Transportation                        60
out of Canadian patriotism rather than actually fulfilling the role of a nation-building project 
(Krugel, 2013a). Whether or not these strategies are effective or not will be demonstrated in the 
coming months when TransCanada begins the regulatory process of approval for the Energy East 
project.  
Advocacy Groups  
 Advocacy groups (also known as interest groups) are groups seeking to influence 
government policy, or decision-making, without putting forward their own candidates during 
elections; furthermore, advocacy groups promote a common interest among members and act 
together to influence public policy (Dyck, 2006). The main difference between advocacy groups 
and the general public is that advocacy groups are involved in “interest articulation,” meaning 
that the group generally has a narrow focus and is organized around a single interest (Dyck, 
2006) whereas the general public has a wide range of interests at any given time. For the purpose 
of this analysis three types of advocacy groups will be examined in relation to their interests 
around oil transportation and the Energy East project in particular. The three groups include 
environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs), First Nations groups, and labour 
unions.  
 The first classification of advocacy groups to explore in terms of their relationship with 
oil transportation in Canada is environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs). 
ENGOs have become more prominent in the Canadian political scene and play an important role 
in educating the public and representing diffuse aggregate interests. The rise of environmental 
groups may be attributed to a number of factors: the success of the environmental movement in 
specific areas, the increased education of the public concerning environmental and resource 
issues, better laws for accessing information, and improved organization capabilities of the 
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environmental groups themselves (Hessing & Howlett, 1997). One of the characteristics of 
advocacy groups is that they generally play a reactive rather than a proactive role in the policy 
process responding to specific issues and problems (Hessing & Howlett, 1997). Currently with 
heightened attention being placed on oil transportation this issue has also attracted the attention 
of ENGOs.  
 Several groups and organizations have focused on the Alberta tar sands and the 
transportation of crude, whether it is from an educational standpoint publishing reports or a more 
action based approach engaging directly with the decision-making processes. The one group that 
has become the most publically involved with the Energy East Pipeline has been the Council of 
Canadians, though not typically identified as an ENGO, as their mandate is more about social 
justice. The Council of Canadians has designed a campaign to oppose Energy East titled “Our 
Risk. Their Reward.” and the organization prepared a tour throughout the month of April that 
held public forums and events in six Ontario communities along the proposed pipeline route 
(Council of Canadians, 2014b). The tour stopped in Kenora, Thunder Bay, North Bay, Ottawa, 
Kemptville, and Cornwall and focused on why the Energy East project involves many risks for 
Ontarians and few rewards (Council of Canadians, 2014b). In addition to providing public 
education and trying to influence public opinion toward the project in areas likely to be affected, 
the Council of Canadians has also interjected themselves more directly in the decision-making 
process. Firstly, the organization added a formal submission to the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) 
as part of the Board’s consultation process on Energy East outlining the risks to Ontario and the 
lack of rewards (Council of Canadians, 2014c). The submission highlights the pipeline as being 
intended for the use of exports, the risk of a bitumen spill in Ontario waterways, pipeline safety, 
the climatic implications of the project, Ontario’s increased reliance on fracked gas imports, and 
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the need for provincial leadership (Council of Canadians, 2014c). Furthermore, the advocacy 
group has asked the Federal Court of Appeal to set aside the National Energy Board’s “List of 
Issues” for the proposed Energy East Pipeline, saying that the list is “unfair, biased and contrary 
to the law” (Council of Canadians, 2014d). The backing of the appeal rests on the fact that the 
“List of Issues” has been determined before the application for the project has been filed with the 
NEB, and is tailored to the interests of the oil industry (Council of Canadians, 2014d).  
 Alongside the Council of Canadians, other ENGOs are present in the discussions 
surrounding Energy East. Environmental Defence has created documents pertaining to the risk of 
the pipeline. Also, in concert with the Council of Canadians, Environmental Defence along with 
Ecology Action Centre and Équiterre released a report on how Energy East is destined as an 
export pipeline (Council of Canadian et al., 2014). In addition, the Pembina Institute published a 
report outlining the climate implications of the Energy East Pipeline (Demerse & Flanagan, 
2014). On a results-based level, the David Suzuki Foundation and Nature Québec along with two 
other environmental groups successfully halted drilling in a beluga whale sensitive area of 
Cacouna, Quebec as part of the project (Scott, 2014). It is also expected that several ENGOs will 
apply for intervenor status in the NEB process. The Saint John Citizens' Coalition for Clean Air 
has already expressed their interest in becoming part of the official process (CBC News, 2014a). 
The actions of these environmental advocacy groups demonstrate their interest in oil 
transportation infrastructure and also go to show that their actions can have an impact. The full 
degree of the impact has yet to be determined in the Energy East case; however, the role of 
ENGOs in monitoring government actions and questioning industry ensure that power is not 
wielded in an inappropriate way without being noticed and brought to the public’s attention.      
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 The second collection of advocacy groups is First Nations organizations. As discussed 
previously, Aboriginal rights are a key institutional factor as well as being a prime societal 
factor. The intersection of provisions governing resource project approvals with hunting and 
trapping rights gives Aboriginal groups a major voice in resource policy areas (Hessing & 
Howlett, 1997). Thus, companies hoping to construct and operate resource projects, such as oil 
transportation infrastructure, are required to find ways to settle the intersecting, and opposing, 
interests of Aboriginal groups and corporate interests. Furthermore, First Nations organizations 
in Canada have become much more vocal about resource development and have organized the 
social movement “Idle No More” to draw attention to issues facing First Nations. As Eriel 
Deranger from the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nations states as part of the movement, “our 
people and our mother earth can no longer afford to be economic hostages in the race to 
[industrialize] our homelands. [It is] time for our people to rise up and take back our role as 
caretakers and stewards of the land” (Idle No More, 2014).    
As has been demonstrated with the Northern Gateway Pipeline, First Nations groups can 
be a major hurdle for pipeline companies. If TransCanada hopes to have the Energy East Pipeline 
approved with little opposition it is essential to garner support from First Nations communities. 
In order to do so, collaboration must occur to create opportunities to become involved in a 
partnership between the company and the communities (Campeau, 2014). What these 
opportunities may look like is unclear. However, native leaders are demanding to be treated as 
not just another stakeholder group but as full partners who have treaty rights that must be 
respected and historical grievances that must be addressed (McCarthy, 2013). In response, 
TransCanada has stated that there are a range of "tools" that the company offers communities, 
but direct payment such as royalties, tariffs or revenue sharing are not being offered (CBC News, 
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2014c). Support for or against the pipeline will ultimately come down to Aboriginal groups 
weighing the environmental risk against the potential economic benefits of the pipeline.  
Labour unions make up the third and final category of advocacy groups that are pertinent 
to this analysis of oil transportation. Labour can occupy a powerful position among groups but 
requires a collective organization, such as a union, to have its voice heard in the policy 
subsystem (Hessing & Howlett, 1997). Unions engage with government and participate in 
political activities in order to shape government policies that affect them (Hessing & Howlett, 
1997). Furthermore, labour unions hold concern over resource and environmental policy-making 
with interests that closely align with business such as preserving jobs and improving wages and 
working conditions (Hessing & Howlett, 1997). Most labour legislation, with the exception of 
the Employment Insurance Act (EI) that is federal, is under the jurisdiction of the provincial 
governments (Dyck, 2006). That being said, unions can be expected to pressure provincial 
governments more so than the federal government in order to pursue their interests.  
 With the Energy East project there is support by unions as well as opposition. The 
support, or opposition, to the project by unions is centred on whether or not the pipeline will 
serve domestic purposes and uses. Unions want to see Alberta crude refined in Canada to support 
local refineries and employment opportunities. For example, the Alberta Federation of Labour 
advocates for domestic processing and is suspicious of the domestic benefits that the project may 
bring, calling the pipeline “a bitumen superhighway designed to ship raw bitumen right past jobs 
and refineries in Canada” (Lewis, 2013a). Another union, the Communications, Energy and 
Paperworkers Union of Canada (CEP) also favours domestic processing and has said that they 
will oppose Energy East if it is not in line with their interests (Lewis, 2013b). Four CEP locals 
have joined forces in Quebec with a large business consortium to provide a united front on the 
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pipeline proposal, representing nearly seventy-five percent of manufacturing jobs in the province 
(Vanderklippe, 2013b). The union workers, coming from four Quebec refineries and chemical 
plants, actively supported Enbridge’s Line 9 Reversal project because the project will provide 
Quebec refineries with supply, but the same coalition has warned that it will oppose Energy East 
if the project is meant to export oil outside of Canada (Vanderklippe, 2013b). Given the findings 
of the report declaring Energy East as an export pipeline (Council of Canadians et al., 2014) it 
can be assumed that these unions will oppose the project on the grounds that the pipeline is not 
intended for domestic use.  
On the other hand, both the national and provincial building trades, Canada’s Building 
Trades Unions (CBTU) and the Provincial Building and Construction Trades Council of Ontario, 
are eager for approval of the project based on the creation of thousands of jobs, less dependence 
on foreign oil, and industrial growth in jobs in Quebec and New Brunswick (CBTU, 2014). 
CBTU has direct interest in the project, for its members will have the opportunity to build the 
pumping stations, marine loading terminals, the storage facilities, and the pipeline (CBTU, 
2014). Other interested unions that appeared at the OEB hearings heard throughout Ontario 
include the International Union of Operating Engineers Local 793; the United Association of 
Plumbers, Steamfitters and Welders Local 800; and the Building and Construction Trades 
Council of Eastern Ontario (Ontario Energy Board, 2014b). The project also has garnered 
support beyond Ontario in New Brunswick. The Construction Association of New Brunswick - 
Saint John (CANB-SJ) publically supports the project, for the association believes that the 
proposed work in pipeline construction is highly relevant to the local industry (Construction 
Association of New Brunswick, 2013). The difference between the unions that oppose and those 
that support the project are that the unions in support of the project are those looking at the short-
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term economic benefits, those associated with the construction of the project components, in 
other words unions with an interest in manufacturing. On the other hand, the unions in 
opposition to the pipeline are interested in the long-term economic benefits that result from the 
operation of the pipeline.  
However, it is not to suggest that unions are only focused on self-interested positions, in 
fact many unions representing workers across Canada are concerned not just in the fate of 
projects such as Energy East, but also in the larger direction of Canadian policy. Unions such as 
CEP, the United Steelworkers of America (USWA), the Canadian Union of Public Employees 
(CUPE), the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW), and many building trades are interested in the 
future of Canada’s energy sector (Calvert & Cohen, 2011). These unions are worried about the 
implications of climate change on employment levels, incomes, and employment security; 
moreover, they have exhibited frustrations towards the government for failing to have a 
transition strategy to address the fundamental economic changes and challenges of climate 
change (Calvert & Cohen, 2011). Furthermore, unions associated with the energy sector have 
been critical of the shift to a market based approach raising concerns over the export orientated 
growth, and the negative environmental impacts of the expansion of the tar sands that are 
promoted by industry (Calvert & Cohen, 2011). As an advocacy group, labour and trade unions 
can be important in raising concerns and challenging the status quo of industry, although the 
degree of their influence over oil transportation decisions and policy has yet to be established.    
Media  
 The media plays an important role in framing issues and shaping public opinion. Most of 
the information Canadians receive about the political process, as well as environmental and 
resource issues, comes from television, newspapers, or radio (Dyck, 2006). In addition to 
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providing information, media coverage raises public perceptions and concerns about 
environmental issues, but also constructs them as economic or political, social or personal, 
radical or conservative (Hessing & Howlett, 1997). Generally, when it comes to reporting 
environmental stories there is a lack of media coverage of environmental events, there is a 
negative portrayal of environmentalists and issues, and there exists a corporate bias in 
environmental coverage (Hessing & Howlett, 1997).  
 Media coverage of resource development, particularly the tar sands and oil transportation 
has become more prominent. Whether or not media coverage has increased due to public 
concern, or increased public concern has been the result of heighten media attention is unclear 
and akin to the chicken and the egg causality dilemma. Regardless of which came first, one 
feature of increased media coverage is that it reflects and contributes to the tar sands debate 
(Holden, 2013). Another feature of increased media attention is the contribution to the “issue 
attention cycle.” The issue attention cycle precludes that government activity on an issue will 
coincide with high levels of public concern (Winfield, 2012a). Furthermore, the “potential 
electoral benefits and risks associated with governmental action or inaction during periods of 
high public salience on an issue can counterbalance the normally dominant structural power of 
business interests relative to civil society organizations” (Winfield, 2012a).     
In discussing the history of the debate over the benefits and costs of resource 
development, Michael Holden (2013) claims that one of the first major news stories to capture 
the public’s attention was the death of 1,600 ducks that landed on a Syncrude tailings pond in 
2008. In an analysis of tar sands media coverage five major themes were evident: pipeline 
construction and market access; regional tensions and regional cooperation in Canada; 
government policies towards tar sands development; foreign investment and control over the tar 
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sands; and social licence to operate and reputation management (Holden, 2013).  Moreover, the 
analysis concluded that with respect to media coverage, pipeline construction and market access 
have become the proxy issue for the entire tar sands development debate (Holden, 2013).  
Not only does pipeline construction and tar sands development go hand in hand in terms 
of media coverage, but the media has also shaped how different types of oil transportation 
methods are viewed. The media has become a battleground between the merits of pipelines over 
rail transportation when it comes to moving crude. Recently, the media has been using train 
derailments to frame pipelines as the superior (and safer) transportation method. Quotes such as 
"a dramatic early morning derailment that caused engine oil to leak [onto] farmland west of 
Saskatoon underscores that pipelines are the best way to transport oil products to market" appear 
in news stories covering rail incidents (Cryderman, 2013b). It also appears that rail derailments 
have increasingly been in the news, whether a function of an increase in actual incidents or an 
increased attention by media is beyond the scope of this analysis. However, the dominant 
sentiment that the media portrays is that companies will ship products by rail unless pipelines are 
built, an unfavourable choice that the media has framed as a sort of ultimatum.   
Another important facet of the media and the coverage of oil transportation stories is how 
the various groups who oppose such projects are conceptualized. It has become a common 
strategy to discredit the concerns of environmentalists and First Nations and frame their 
opposition in a negative lens, akin to being enemies of the state. Previous Natural Resource 
Minister Joe Oliver has been quite vocal in decrying that environmental and other "radical 
groups" are trying to block trade and undermine Canada's economy in order to “achieve their 
radical ideological agenda” (Payton, 2012). This sentiment is perpetuated in the media to the 
extent that “radical environmentalists” are being presented as blocking Canada’s future energy 
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and economic path. When the media frames opposition as “anti-development” or “anti-pipeline” 
it fails to recognize that the discussion is actually much larger in scope, and a main reason why 
these groups are opposed to such projects is one way that they seek to influence broader 
discussions on sustainable development of the tar sands and climate change. When these groups 
that are viewed as a “threat” are slandered in the media it frames them as “implacable adversaries 
to be monitored and battled, rather than well-meaning advocates to be consulted” (McCarthy, 
2012). Therefore, how the media frames such advocates can be instrumental in removing their 
power and shifting the power to those who have “legitimate” concerns, such as industry.          
Corporate Interests   
 Corporate, or industry, interests also fall into the category of non-governmental actors; 
however, arguably corporate interests wield the highest level of power and influence of all of the 
non-state actors over the decision and actions of governmental actors. The Canadian state tends 
to give priority to big business demands for a variety of reasons chief among them being the 
government depends of the private sector to create jobs, corporate executives and politicians 
often come from the same ranks, companies have more avenues of influence available, corporate 
elites control the mass media to an extent, and political parties have been financed primarily by 
large corporate contributions (Dyck, 2006). Currently, Canada’s Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
reveals the deep connection between industry and politicians, as he is the son of an Imperial Oil 
executive, and not surprisingly has been a key promoter of the tar sands, proclaiming Canada as 
“an emerging energy superpower” (Nikiforuk, 2010). Another evident sign of industry’s fingers 
all over the government is the prominent shift to ideologies of market liberalism, as discussed 
previously. The general demands on policy by corporate interests seek to minimize the role of 
government and fashion a society that relies more extensively on private market forces (Dyck, 
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2006). Therefore, initiatives such as Harper’s responsible resource management that focuses on 
making the review process for major projects more predictable and timely as well as reducing 
duplication in the review process are for the benefit of industry looking to not be slowed down 
and interfered with by government. For the purpose of this analysis, three specific aspects of 
corporate interests with respect to oil transportation and the tar sands will be explored. These 
interests are broken down into the interests of the energy and producer companies, pipeline 
companies, and foreign investment.  
 When discussing energy and transportation, the companies that are being referred to are 
those at either end of the transportation line. Thus the energy companies at the one end include 
the oil companies that are involved in extracting and producing the bitumen from the tar sands, 
while at the other end are the refining companies. In the past, the oil industry enjoyed a great 
deal of autonomy in the years prior to 1973 whereby the federal government did not challenge 
the fundamental power of the industry and both the government and business shared compatible 
interests surrounding growth of the industry (Doern & Toner, 1985). Following a hands-off 
approach by government, in 1980 the Trudeau government introduced the National Energy Plan 
with the overarching goal of changing the structure of balance between the industry and 
government (Doern & Toner, 1985). The NEP lasted no more than five years; the election of the 
Mulroney government in 1984 dismantled the program (Doern & Toner, 1985). Since that time 
the oil industry has regained its power and dominance, shaping Canadian energy politics around 
its interests.  
 When it comes to energy companies responsible for producing the crude in Alberta, the 
number one priority is to reach new markets for its increased production (CAPP, 2013). The 
desire to reach new markets is driven by their interest in profits. The current political economy of 
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the tar sands sector is that profits are being constrained by an inability to expand market access 
due to limited pipeline capacity, and this in turn constrains growth affecting profits and revenues, 
and also creates the price discount on Canadian products (Hoberg, 2013). For example, the 
Joslyn oil sands mine, an $11 billion project, has been recently shelved indefinitely as a result of 
rising industry costs that worked against the economics of a new project (Tait, 2014). The rising 
industry costs are attributable to rising costs for labour and materials as well as limited pipeline 
access to ship oil weighing on prices (Tait, 2014). Thus the sector, meaning the energy 
companies, would benefit from greater access to tidewaters in order to reach these expanding 
markets (Hoberg, 2013). TransCanada states that the significant commercial demand by Western 
Canadian producers to improve access to markets in Eastern Canada and offshore markets spurs 
the need for the Energy East project (TransCanada, 2014b). The demand was tested in an open 
season that resulted in long-term shipping commitments of approximately 900,000 barrels per 
day (TransCanada, 2014b). Overall, producer companies are driven like all other companies by 
profits, and the higher a price that can be fetched on their product the better, such that companies 
are interested in market diversification that will reach tidewaters in order to sell their product for 
world prices.  
 The second set of interested energy companies is the refineries that are downstream of the 
pipeline. Refineries, unlike the producing companies, want to minimize their input costs such 
that cheaper, or discounted prices benefit their interests (Hoberg, 2013). Such is the reason that 
Eastern Canada refineries have been reliant on imported sources of crude, which are cheaper 
than Western Canadian sources. However, the situation with refineries can be complicated by the 
fact that there is a high degree of vertical integration evident in the oil industry in the sense that 
many producers also have substantial refinery assets (Hoberg, 2013). For example, Suncor holds 
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one of the largest positions in the Alberta tar sands, yet also owns a refinery in Montreal, a 
perceived destination point of Energy East (Suncor, 2014). Higher oil prices benefit the upstream 
activities of Suncor, yet disadvantage its downstream counterparts and vice versa. When 
examining the differences between the producer companies and the refining companies in terms 
of Energy East is becomes clear that the benefits are targeted at the producers who are frantic for 
market diversification. As the report by the Council of Canadians and colleagues (2014) points 
out, Eastern Canadian refineries have no extra capacity that needs filing, and as demonstrated by 
the sentiments of unions representing the interest of refinery workers Energy East is a project not 
within their interests.   
 While pipeline companies and oil companies have generally the same interests, 
transporting crude from the extraction point to market, there are some fundamental differences 
between the two. One debate surrounding pipelines by economists is whether and how pipelines 
sustain their natural monopoly position (Makholm, 2012). On the one hand, pipelines inherent 
economies of scale limit their number concentrating full markets around a relatively small 
number of pipelines, yet on the other hand pipelines are victims of geography and geology and as 
non-redeployable capital are left stranded and value-less if reserves or markets change 
(Makholm, 2012). Recently, markets have been shifting with an example of changing market 
dynamics reflected in the Energy East project. First, the portion of pipeline that TransCanada is 
intending to repurpose to oil service was originally purposed for natural gas transport; however, 
volumes of natural gas has been plummeting as the U.S. shale boom has undercut demand for 
Canadian gas (Lewis, 2014b). With oil pipelines being in demand it only makes sense for 
TransCanada to designate its old gas pipeline to oil service to meet the demand of the changing 
market dynamics instead of losing money on a no longer profitable service. Secondly, the 
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historical trend has been to construct pipelines connecting Canada with the United States, rather 
than across Canada, since the market favoured transporting oil into the U.S. due to the economic 
efficiency of taking advantage of the economies of scale (Doern & Toner, 1985). With the 
current oil glut in the United States Midwest, pipelines serving this market have become 
unfavourable as well. Therefore, pipeline companies are being pressured by the interests that 
they serve to build new infrastructure to reach new markets.  
 The final corporate interest that relates to oil transportation is foreign ownership in the 
Canadian tar sands. In 1980, with the National Energy Program, a fifty percent target was set 
such that by 1990 fifty percent of the oil industry was to be under Canadian ownership with 
preference given to private Canadian firms (Doern & Toner, 1985). Due to pressure from the 
U.S., the ownership incentives were removed (Dyck, 2006). Since then Canada has been open to 
foreign investment, cited as an important component of a competitive market (Dawson & 
Bartucci, 2012). The presence of foreign investment in the tar sands has implications as to which 
markets are desired for export.  
An in-depth review of shareholder information from Bloomberg conducted by 
ForestEthics Advocacy reveals that seventy-one percent of all tar sands production is owned by 
non-Canadian shareholders (ForestEthics Advocacy, 2012). Furthermore, foreign headquartered 
companies represent a market capitalization of $391 billion and control 24.2 percent of all tar 
sands production (ForestEthics Advocacy, 2012). The current trend of foreign ownership has 
been towards Chinese investment in the tar sands. China’s Sinopec owns nearly ten percent of 
Syncrude, one of Canada’s largest ventures in the tar sands (Dawson & Bartucci, 2012). In 
addition to Syncrude, there have been other Chinese acquisitions including the MacKay River 
Project and Daylight Energy Ltd. (Dawson & Bartucci, 2012). By far the largest Chinese 
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acquisition has been Chinese state-owned firm CNOOC Ltd.’s recent $15.1 billion takeover of 
Nexen Inc. (Krugel, 2013b). With all of the new Chinese investment in the tar sands the push to 
access tidewater to reach Asian markets appears intuitive, especially since many of the Chinese 
firms are state-owned, the Chinese government wants to ensure it can meet its country’s growing 
demand for oil.  
Foreign ownership may also challenge any new initiatives by the Canadian government 
to implement stronger environmental regulations, such as emission standards, in the tar sands or 
the oil industry in general. According to Maude Barlow, NAFTA can be used by U.S. oil 
companies operating in Alberta to sue the Canadian government if any level of government 
passes a law restricting the company’s profits (Zarate, 2008). In relation to Chinese-based 
companies, an investment deal between Canada and China has resulted in similar powers being 
granted to foreign-owned companies such that any decision by any state entity in Canada, 
including a Supreme Court of Canada decision, can be challenged by a Chinese investor, while 
not even the Canadian federal government will be able to sue a Chinese investor for breaking any 
Canadian laws (Van Harten, 2012). The implication of this power granted to foreign owned 
companies in the tar sands is that there is the potential for legal challenge against the Canadian 
government if it makes changes to regulations in the tar sands such as regulations on emissions 
(Zarate, 2008). The fear of lawsuit reduces the sovereign ability of Canadian governments to 
enact regulations that will serve to protect the environment, placing foreign owned companies 
profits ahead of a healthy environment for Canadian citizens.   
Part IV Conclusion: The Implications for Canada  
The institutional-ideological analytical framework developed at the beginning of this 
analysis divided the various political economic factors at play with regards to oil transportation 
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in Canada into four categories: material, physical, and economic factors; normative factors; 
institutional factors; and interests and societal factors. As my analysis of these factors 
demonstrates through the case of the Energy East Pipeline, there are various interests, power 
relationships, and inherent realities that have come to shape, and continue to influence, Canadian 
oil transportation infrastructure systems. These various infrastructure projects have an important 
role to play when it comes to expansion and development of the Alberta tar sands. An outcome 
of this analysis was to bring to light the complexity and interrelatedness of each factor and to 
demonstrate how various actors and interests interact with the various categories of analysis. In 
addition, through examining the Energy East case study, the link between transportation 
infrastructure and the expansion of the tar sands was further established. Furthermore, as a result 
of this analysis two conclusions are presented in terms of the implications for Canada if it 
continues on its current energy path as identified in this paper; however, the conclusions are 
tentative as the pipeline is still in its infancy of the regulatory process and much is still uncertain, 
yet the conclusions provide a useful ground for further discussions and analysis.      
After analyzing the political economy of oil transportation in Canada using the Energy 
East Pipeline as a case study, it can be concluded that the debates and challenges by various 
actors and interests suggest a strong need in Canada for a formal debate on energy sustainability 
and the future direction of the tar sands. This need for a debate is perpetuated by the fact that 
Canada currently does not have a national energy policy in place to address such concerns. 
Secondly, insight into the existence of the various power relationships and the influence of 
interests identified throughout this analysis highlights areas where there is the potential for 
change and challenge to the dominant ideas. These challenges for change serve to speak to the 
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current energy and natural resource regime of the Harper government and could prove to be 
instrumental in promoting a different policy agenda.  
Need for National Discussion of Canada’s Future Energy Path   
In 1980 the Trudeau government introduced the National Energy Program with the goals 
of Canada seizing control of their own energy future through energy security, to offer Canadians 
the opportunity to participate in the energy industry, and to share in the benefits of industry 
expansion recognizing the requirement of fairness (Doern & Toner, 1985). According to Mark 
Winfield (2012b) the conventionally accepted view is that Canada has not had a national energy 
policy framework since the Mulroney government disbanded the NEP in 1984. Without a 
national energy plan there fails to be a democratic avenue for discussion as to the direction of 
natural resource development, particularly of the Alberta tar sands. The current analysis of the 
political economy of oil transportation in Canada highlights some of these conflicts and 
demonstrates the desire by Canadians to engage in larger debates of an overall Canadian energy 
strategy using oil transportation at a catalyst for these debates to occur, as there currently is no 
other forum to challenge the larger development of the tar sands and Canada’s hydrocarbon 
future.  
 While the Energy East Pipeline, and other projects, has as of yet been constructed, this 
analysis draws attention to the current political economy in which these infrastructure decisions 
are being made and whose interests are being promoted. The analysis also serves to raise a 
warning of where Canada is headed in terms of its hydrocarbon based energy path, and how new 
oil transportation infrastructure will further entrench Canada in this unsustainable future. As 
demonstrated, Canada is dependent on exporting its energy resources, has adopted the principles 
of market liberalism, believes that the national interest is in the economic viability of the tar 
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sands, has increasingly placed power in the undemocratic hands of the executive and the Prime 
Minister, used the media to slander environmental concerns and promote the tar sands, and is 
heavily influenced by corporate interests. In turn, Canada has placed a great deal of emphasis on 
further exploiting the bitumen resource in the tar sands leading to a variety of social, 
environmental, and climatic consequences and injustices (Scott, 2013; Nikiforuk, 2010). These 
consequences are exasperated by the current political economy of Canada and are expected to 
become worse if the current regime is not challenged and changed.    
For starters, this analysis explored various material, physical, and economic factors, 
many of which are static and cannot change, such as the distribution of energy resources across 
Canada. One economic factor that weighs heavily on the current trajectory of Canada in terms of 
its resource use is its location in the global economy as an energy exporter and producer. While 
Canada lacks a national energy plan this results in no security of a domestic supply of resources 
and instead focuses on exporting the largest quantity of goods. Such is demonstrated by the 
negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership that will provide Canadian energy producers to 
growing markets in Asia for export (Dawson & Bartucci, 2012). Without a national strategy that 
is securing resources for domestic use, future generations of Canadians may be left having to rely 
on imported products to serve their own energy needs, while domestic product is all allocated for 
foreign markets.  
The position of Canada as a net energy exporter may in part be explained by the 
ideological approach towards market liberalism that sees government take a back seat to private 
capital. The minimized role of the state in turn sees private capital as directing natural resource 
development (Winfield, 2012). One of the main consequences of market liberalism is that 
capitalist market forces determine the distribution of power and wealth (Dyck, 2006). This 
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distribution results in inequalities and a natural resource path this is based on the exploitation of 
resources for short-term capital gain rather than long-term sustainable prosperity.  
A second ideological factor at play is the notion of the national interest and whose 
conception of what constitutes as the “national interest” is being sought after and portrayed. For 
example there is widespread notion held by politicians and energy companies that pipelines are 
the future of Canada and will make this country “stronger” (Krugel, 2013a). However, support 
for a halting or slowing down activities in the tar sands in the name of the national interest led by 
environmental advocacy groups cite greenhouse gas emissions (Demerse & Flanagan, 2014) and 
a lack of economic benefits to Eastern Canada (Council of Canadians et al., 2014) as reasons. 
Furthermore, “increased pipeline capacity means more tar sands extraction, more greenhouse gas 
emissions, and more climate change” (Scott, 2013). The battle of the claim to the “national 
interest” is no more than a battle of the economy versus the environment, whereby if the 
economic reasons win there is little hope of slowing down future development, pipeline projects, 
and dire climatic consequences.         
 In addition to economic and ideological factors, a very important institutional factor that 
is leading the charge for Canada’s hydrocarbon future is the structure of the cabinet-
parliamentary government in Ottawa. As illustrated, increasingly the power of the executive 
level of government, the Cabinet and the Prime Minister’s Office, is being concentrated 
(Ibbitson, 2013). The concentration of power results in the lack of ability of Members of 
Parliament to exercise power in the legislature, and the passing of legislation geared at seeing the 
interests of the Prime Minster and Cabinet fulfilled, most notably Bill C-38. With a diminished 
role of Parliament, the current emphasis on repealing environmental legislation for the benefit of 
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natural resource led economic development can continue unchallenged by those meant to 
represent the people of Canada.  
 The final category of factors examined in the political economy of oil transportation has 
been societal factors. The media is one such societal factor that shapes the debates and 
conversations surrounding oil transportation and the tar sands by constructing environmental 
issues as economic or political, social or personal, and radical or conservative (Hessing & 
Howlett, 1997). Importantly, not only does the media frame the issue, yet it also frames the 
groups that are involved in the issue. It has been a general trend to frame environmentalists and 
Aboriginal groups as “radical” and a “threat” to the Canadian economy that then discredits the 
need to consult with these groups (McCarthy, 2012). These “radical” groups are villianized for 
wanting to draw attention to the current trajectory of the federal government and the oil industry 
in terms of resource development and climate change.  Furthermore, analysis of the media and its 
role in the debate over the benefits and costs of resource development finds that pipeline 
construction and market access have become proxy issues for the entire tar sands development 
debate (Holden, 2013) as there is currently no forum for this separate, yet highly important, 
debate to occur. As such, groups seeking to challenge the current strategy towards oil and 
resources in Canada will continue to be viewed as a threat to the economy and development as 
long as there is no other way to challenge and question the current regime.   
 In conclusion, another aspect of the current political economy of oil transportation and tar 
sands development that will continue to be exasperated without a national energy policy is the 
role and influence of corporate interests on governmental resource and energy policy. The 
National Energy Program of the eighties highlighted the interests of government in changing the 
structure of power between industry and government, in essence transferring power over the oil 
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industry back into the hands of the Canadian government (Doern & Toner, 1985). In the absence 
of a national energy policy, corporate interests have been able to exercise a great deal of power 
in shaping the path of the oil industry in Canada. The number one priority of energy companies 
has been to reach new markets for its increased production of oil in the tar sands (CAPP, 2013). 
This need to access new markets, driven by seeking higher profits for their produced products, 
provides an argument for the “need” of new transportation infrastructure such as the Energy East 
Pipeline. In addition to the push for more transportation infrastructure, the ownership of 
companies in the tar sands also influences Canada’s economic and environmental path. 
Increasingly foreign ownership makes it challenging for the government, even if it wanted to, 
impose stricter environmental regulations in order to address climate change due to investment 
treaty lawsuits brought on by companies under agreements such as NAFTA or the China-Canada 
Investment Treaty (Linnett, 2012). A national energy policy could have the potential to mandate 
emission standards as part of a larger energy strategy and could also take steps to restructure the 
power relationship between industry and government fulfilling, Trudeau’s goal from more than 
thirty years ago.         
Potential for Change and Challenge to the Dominant Ideas   
 As of yet, the only way to challenge the dominant ideas of resource extraction in the tar 
sands and Canada’s future energy path has been through debates and discussions of oil 
transportation. According to scholars Dayna Scott (2013) and George Hoberg (2013), pipeline 
capacity currently presents the main brake on extraction activities in the tar sands, and as such, 
opponents having recognized the role of transportation infrastructure in constraining growth have 
sought to block the approval of new transportation projects. In terms of opponents of new 
pipeline capacity, this analysis highlights several institutional factors, societal actors, and 
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ideological elements that have the potential to change and or challenge the dominant and current 
political economic relationships and interests. The institutional factors include the potential veto 
of provincial governments and the legal protection of Aboriginal rights. The societal actors 
include the public, with both the media and advocacy groups influencing the opinion of societal 
actors. Finally, the ideological factors that could be challenged in terms of emphasis are market 
liberalism and sustainable development.  
   The first potential for change and challenge to the dominant ideas of resource extraction 
in the tar sands and the transportation of oil are the provinces, specifically the provincial 
governments. Due to changing markets dynamics and the fact that Alberta resources are land-
locked on either side, the growing urgency by the oil industry to seek access to tidewaters is 
bringing the provinces to the table to join in on the debates. When Alberta oil producers were 
relying on U.S. markets for their exports, oil transportation was a conversation held between 
Alberta, and the two federal governments, Canada and the United States. With the present oil 
glut in the United States (Spears, 2013) along with the growing markets in China and India 
(CAPP, 2013) the need to transport Canadian oil across Canada in order to reach coastal waters 
has become the top priority for oil producers. However, in order to reach either coast any new 
infrastructure project requires traversing another province in addition to Alberta. The 
involvement of other provinces, which do not see direct economic benefits from the sale of oil, 
stirs up ideas surrounding the equity of risks and benefits and challenges to the idea of pipelines 
being in the “national interest.”    
 As demonstrated, the constitutional authority over interprovincial pipelines lies with the 
federal government, but the provincial responsibility over property and civil rights as well as 
environmental issues associated with land use planning creates a patchwork of legislation and 
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regulations (Dawson & Bartucci, 2012). This patchwork in essence makes it such that although 
the federal government makes the final decision, a significant number of provincial approvals are 
also required for interprovincial oil transportation projects to get the go ahead (Hoberg, 2013). 
While New Brunswick has expressed its support for the Energy East Pipeline it remains to be 
seen where other provinces stand on the project, namely Ontario and Quebec, and if they will 
exert their own political pressure to try and sway the project.  
 Other powerful actors that have the potential to challenge the direction of Canada’s 
energy strategy include several First Nations communities. Aboriginal groups are a strong 
institutional factor given their protected treaty and Aboriginal title rights. Their rights, which 
include the duty to consult, provide the avenue for legal challenge. The successful application of 
such rights has recently been demonstrated in the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal, granting 
the Chippewas of the Thames First Nation leave to take their challenge of the Line 9 Pipeline 
decision to court on the issue of Aboriginal consultation (Leahy, 2014b). Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court of Canada very recently determined in the case Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British 
Columbia, 2014 SCC 44, that Aboriginal bands may still hold title to ancestral lands, unless they 
signed away these rights in treaties with government or otherwise ceded title to the Crown  (Fine, 
2014). Furthermore, the court decision holds that Aboriginal title includes the right to exclusive 
occupation of the traditional territory, yet this right can be “justifiably infringed” by the 
government in certain circumstances, such as a “compelling and substantial public purpose” 
(Bradley & Luk, 2014). However, the Court has made it clear that these are intended to be high 
hurdles for the government to meet and the Court “cautions that projects begun without consent 
on claimed Aboriginal title lands may need to be cancelled, if the title claims are eventually 
proven and the Crown [cannot] show justified infringement” (Bradley & Luk, 2014). The 
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interpretation from some commentators is that the new ruling on Aboriginal title creates further 
obstacles to natural resource development, especially pipelines (Newman, 2014). Since Canada 
has no substantive environmental rights (Boyd, 2012), yet the Crown has an obligation to consult 
and accommodate First Nations when projects could affect their rights and title (Hoberg, 2013), 
the constitutionally protected Aboriginal rights are one of the only ways to successfully 
challenge oil transportation decisions in a legal setting.       
 Not only do First Nations have legal tools at their disposal to challenge oil transportation 
decisions, such as pipelines, but also as a collective group they have been successful at drawing 
public and political attention towards resource development by acting as environmental stewards. 
The social movement “Idle No More,” that began to become highly visible in December 2012, 
was the result of indigenous peoples across the country seeking to demonstrate solidarity against 
the federal government’s legislative agenda (Scott, 2013). The importance of the Idle No More 
movement has been a way to showcase growing indigenous resistance on a national scale that is 
centred on lands and resources (Scott, 2013). This resistance and solidarity of activism provides 
a united front that directly challenges the dominant regime of natural resource exploitation; 
furthermore, challenging the need for new energy infrastructure such as oil pipelines.  
 In addition to the institutional challenges to the dominant ideas surrounding oil 
transportation that are seen in the jurisdictional authority of the provinces and legal challenges 
stemming from Aboriginal rights, the public is a societal factor that also has the potential to 
advocate for change. The most important role of the public is in pressuring debates to occur such 
as has been demonstrated in terms of pipelines and the transportation of oil across the country. 
Changing levels in societal concern for the environment can be important drivers for 
environmental policy (Winfield, 2012). With increased attention being placed upon how oil is 
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transported and new infrastructure projects, societal concern is high. The lack of a social license, 
according to Thomas Mulcair, results in the failure to build new energy infrastructure (Argitis, 
2014).  
 It is also important to note that various other actors influence how the public responds to 
environmental and energy issues. For starters, the media can be highly influential in providing 
information and also in constructing environmental issues (Hessing & Howlett, 1997). With 
pipelines being front-page news, the media has raised the public’s perception on the issue and 
sparked the debates. The second societal factor that influences public opinion is advocacy groups 
such as environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs). The main role of ENGOs in 
relation to the public is to serve as an educator and to provide a different set of information than 
is provided by industry and the government. Advocacy groups themselves challenge dominant 
ideas, but harnessing the support of the public in these battles is integral in striking larger 
opposition and dissent in order to pressure for change. While public opposition has been a large 
part of the Northern Gateway Pipeline in British Columbia and with the Line 9 Pipeline in 
Toronto a united front against Energy East has yet to harness the same momentum. Since the 
pipeline traverses such as large area there is, as of yet, no obvious geographic battle ground, but 
that is expected to change once TransCanada files its official application with the National 
Energy Board this summer as the decision-making process gets underway.   
 Not only are there institutional factors and societal actors that have the potential to 
challenge the rampant tar sands expansion and associated oil transportation systems, there are 
also normative factors such as ideas and ideologies surrounding oil transportation that could 
change how natural resource development is thought about. The two ideologies that stand to 
have the most influence are sustainable development and market liberalism, specifically an 
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adherence and development path based on sustainable development and a challenge to the 
capitalist notions that markets are the best way to manage resources. Challenging market 
liberalism would entail a more domestic and national energy approach that is focused on 
Canadian energy needs, not where oil producers can capitalize on profits. The pipeline debates 
are currently centred on accessing global energy markets, yet if the reliance on market principles 
guiding Canada’s tar sands development were challenged the need for such pipelines would be 
immediately called into question.  
 The second ideological factor that could come to influence how natural resources are 
conceptualized in Canada is sustainable development. Based upon the notion that sustainable 
development entails “development that meets the needs of the future without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs” oil conservation should be a top priority 
(WCED, 1987). However, the current trend in Canada is the complete opposite, with production 
increasing and estimated to be 6.7 million barrels per day in 2030 (CAPP, 2013). If Canada were 
to adopt a natural resource strategy based on sustainable development principles then the 
expansion of the tar sands would be called into question, as would the development of new 
transportation infrastructure. Whether or not sustainable development ideologies will find a way 
into federal politics is not likely with the current Harper regime; however, a change in leadership 
could be the catalyst for a change in ideological perspective.  
Energy East and debates on oil transportation come at a time when Canada is at the 
crossroads of its energy future. The one path takes Canada down the road that it appears to be 
heading where natural resources are exploited at unsustainable rates, oil transportation projects 
are approved in order to continue the high levels of production in the tar sands, and there is little 
regard for climate change and protection of the environment. On the other hand, is a path that 
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sees Canada take the time to develop a national energy policy, the pace of development halts or 
is slowed, the public becomes more engaged in directing the future, and bolder initiatives are 
made towards addressing climate change and promoting green energy. It is time that Canada as a 
whole begins to ask itself what choice it wants to make, what path it wants to go down, for it is a 
choice that will impact us all. As David Suzuki (2014b) says, “it's about the kind of country -- 
and planet -- we want to leave to our children and grandchildren.”  
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